Revision of remarks presented in Hanoi on November 22, 2004, at a workshop entitled “Vietnam-USA: Promotion of Understanding Towards the Future”. 

The remarks respond to questions posed by the organizers, the Vietnam Peace and Development Foundation and the Vietnam-USA Society under the sponsorship of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations.

 

Implication of the Vietnam War on the US-Vietnam Bilateral Relationship

  By John McAuliff, Executive Director, Fund for Reconciliation and Development

1)       How is today’s perception of American public on the Vietnam War? Which are major trends and why? How does it affect the US-Vietnam relationship?

 

A few months ago, it would have been possible to say that America’s war in Vietnam was declining as a factor in our national consciousness.  More and more, in the phrase first used by Le Van Bang, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam was becoming a country, not a war. 

 

The US had become Vietnam’s largest market; Americans constituted the second largest contingent of tourists.  More and more students, business people and average Americans were coming to see spending time in Vietnam as a very normal thing to do, in which differences in cultures and geography were at least as much an attraction as our painful and destructive shared history from 1945 to 1975.  In addition, growing numbers of Vietnamese students were coming to the US on government sponsored programs and through private family resources.

 

Attention to resolving the divisive POW/MIA issue began in the Administrations of Ronald Reagan and the first President Bush, but was effectively laid to rest by the Congressional hearings led by Senator John Kerry and the practical cooperation between American and Vietnamese military personnel.  President Clinton’s rapid fire ending of the trade embargo, establishment of normal diplomatic relations and negotiation of a trade agreement, was capped by his personal visit here.  The current Bush Administration, to its credit, followed through on implementation of the trade agreement and establishment of the Congressionally mandated Vietnam Education Fund.

 

In American public opinion the Vietnam war had become largely symbolic, emerging most often in the debate over the illegal US invasion and occupation of Iraq. 

 

[Proponents of the war insisted Iraq would not become another Vietnam.  After all the country was dominated by deserts not by jungles and the people would welcome their liberation from Saddam Hussein. 

 

Opponents argued that nationalism and culture would generate resistance and that the US would be sucked into a Vietnam-like quagmire.  Denying the popular base of the Baath party, its right to participate in any transitional government, and the need to seriously negotiate with armed opponents would prove to be as self-delusional and counter productive as had American refusal, until it was too late, to accept the legitimate interests of the National Liberation Front and of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.]

 

There were a few exceptions to the evolving normalcy with Vietnam, but they were confined to relatively small special interest groups:

 

1)      The embittered old guard of the Vietnamese-American community succeeded in promoting the adoption of about 100 resolutions in City Councils and State Legislatures that gave recognition to the flag of the pre-1975 government of South Vietnam as a “community flag” to be flown on public occasions.

2)      Vietnamese-Americans who favor engagement with their (or their parents) original homeland are emerging from the shadows, not only speaking, writing and making films about personal involvement and doing business, but also holding the first national conference of groups that provide humanitarian and educational assistance.

3)      Conservative evangelical Christians pressed successfully for the designation of Vietnam as a Country of Particular Concern because of alleged limits on religious freedom

4)      Hostile resolutions were adopted by overwhelming majorities in the House of Representatives that combined the concerns of human rights advocacy organizations with the political agendas of old guard Vietnamese-Americans and American conservatives

5)      A series of articles in an Ohio newspaper exposed the unpunished atrocities of an American military unit in Quang Ngai. The newspaper won a Pulitzer Prize and some other publications summarized its findings, the Pentagon pledged to reopen the investigation, but there was negligible impact on the public or US government.

6)      The issue of the consequences of Agent Orange use began to attract new attention, but was still very marginal in public consciousness.

7)      US NGOs with programs in Vietnam conveyed to Congress individually or collaboratively the perspective their experience here gave to pending legislation.

 

American universities continued to teach hundreds of courses about the war and its impact on American society, but I don’t know whether they are still as popular with students as in the past.

 

In general it can be said that the war itself was declining as a topic of interest, and that the most active echoes of it were expressed by negative remnants of the past.  They were capable of doing some damage around the edges, but the primary dynamic in American society was to move beyond the war.  (This is not unlike the trajectory of US-China relations.)

 

Then came the election.

 

John Kerry’s campaign made a decision to run on his Vietnam record. During the primaries and the Democratic convention he was surrounded by symbols of his military service including the very visible presence of members of his Swift Boat crew.  I assume his advisers believed this would symbolize that his documented courage and military experience qualified him to replace a wartime President.  They did not hide his important role in the anti-war movement, but the central theme was one of patriotic service in the military, of “defending his country”, in implicit contrast to the leaders of the Bush Administration who as young men supported the war ideologically but at all costs avoided actually being part of it. 

 

The Republicans counterattacked with dishonest television ads from the ostensibly independent Swift Boat Veterans for Truth group that questioned whether Kerry actually deserved his combat medals.  By the time the truth caught up, the damage was done.  The next phase of their ads used former prisoners of war to attack Kerry’s anti-war activism, interplaying selected archive footage from his testimony before the Senate with their contemporary accusations that they had felt he betrayed them and the country.

 

Kerry was also attacked from the left for his war time actions, but that had no discernable impact.

 

It took Kerry too long to respond, and even then he did so more in personal terms than by revisiting the character of the war and the lessons learned from post-war reconciliation.  An excellent documentary linking his military and anti-war experience was produced, “Going Upriver”, but it was seen by few people who were not already pro-Kerry. 

 

At root, it is very difficult to embrace both the traditional symbols of patriotic nationalism and opposition to an illegitimate war.  It is complicated to claim credit for courageously defending one’s country while acknowledging that was done intervening in someone else’s country without real justification.  Separating the valor of the warrior from the value of the war can be accomplished theoretically but is hard practically.  The contradiction can be resolved in the evolution of peoples’ lives and roles, especially through the theme of post-war reconciliation, but is not conveyed easily to those who do not share the experience and certainly not in a 30 second sound-bite.

 

Kerry’s support among veterans dropped noticeably after the Swift Boat ads.  And this presumably was one reason that many God fearing patriotic rural and suburban Americans rallied to, or settled for, President Bush. 

 

Unfortunately, for the purposes of this conference, the extent to which the election contest refought the Vietnam War was not helpful, particularly since the wrong side would appear to have won the debate in terms of the result.  Viewpoints and political forces that had been in decline since the Clinton normalization process have reemerged.  We can anticipate the impact on US-Vietnam relations of votes Bush received from the evangelical Christian right.  It is harder to predict whether people like the Swift Boat veterans will seek to influence current policy, but they certainly poisoned the atmosphere.

 

2)      How is implication of the case of victims of Agent Orange on the US-Vietnam relationship?

Had John Kerry been elected, the situation of Agent Orange victims would have offered one of several opportunities to move the US-Vietnam relationship to a new and more profound level of true reconciliation and friendship.  Kerry had demonstrated considerable interest in the Agent Orange issue, initially among his fellow American veterans, but also for its consequences here.

During a second Bush Presidency, the struggle to achieve recognition and justice for Agent Orange victims will be far more difficult.  We are working against an administration that is likely to defend vigorously the interests of US chemical companies that manufactured the defoliants.  In addition, the Pentagon’s policy to reject any legal or moral responsibility for collateral damage in war time can only become more rigid as revelations grow from the dirty side of the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

 

On the positive side there is a growing interest in the Agent Orange issue in the US.  In part this is because both you and we can afford to let the problem assume its deserved place.  In the past, our mutual priority was to achieve normal diplomatic, political, cultural and economic relations.  Anything that reminded Americans or Vietnamese of the war, including its human legacies, could have interfered with our success.

 

Now that Vietnam is letting the problem come to the surface, Americans are more likely to have to confront the unintended consequences of past actions.   My own organization is supporting the legal case made by Vietnamese victims, cosponsored the benefit premier of two Agent Orange films last week in New York that raised about $1,500 for the Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange, and offers a channel for Americans to make tax deductible donations to assist victims.  (To date we have been able to pass on a donation made by Barbara Webster, the former secretary of Dave Dellinger, to the Vietnam Red Cross, and donations made in the memory of Chris Jenkins to support treatment provided by Dr. Nguyen Viet Nhan of the Hue Medical College.)

 

In January we will launch an on-line multi-media educational exhibit that can be downloaded for use by secondary schools, universities, community organizations, and religious groups. 

 

Press attention to the issue has increased, although it is not all favorable.  We will face political, scientific and legal opposition.  The conservative wing of the Vietnamese-American community has already taken a strong position that Agent Orange is just another trick by the communists to fool Americans and steal money.  In addition to the absurdity of their rhetoric, they may be challenged by a hidden problem in their own community.  Vietnamese who emigrated to the US after the war largely came from urban sections, but a significant number had served in the ARVN or lived in defoliated areas.  Anecdotally, we think they may also be suffering from the effects of Agent Orange, but there is no scientific evidence.

 

Ultimately, the responsibility for assisting victims should fall on those responsible for their fate, even though unintentionally--the chemical companies and the US government.  However, we should not be trapped into awaiting a final resolution of scientific and legal controversies.  We should call for the acceptance of responsibility, but not demand it.  It is sufficient, especially in the context of a second Bush Administration, to obtain assistance for clean-up of hot spots, simply treating locations of current dioxin contamination as a serious environmental problem, without linking that assistance to who dumped the chemicals.  Similarly, an effort should be made to generate US government assistance to those suffering birth defects, cancers, and other possible consequences of Agent Orange, as well as to their families and local medical support systems, simply for humanitarian reasons.

 

3)       What are other war legacies that affect the bilateral relations?

The other visible war legacy, land mines and unexploded ordnance, has not been as controversial.  In addition to NGO aid to victims and in educational programs, a modest amount of help has come from the US government and military.  However, more can and should be done with official US assistance.

 

Psychological legacies provide another complicated front for work.  In a sense much of America has been in a state of denial, or under an unspoken internal truce agreement not to speak about what took place in Vietnam and the reasons for our intervention and loss of the war.  The impact of that denial and silence on official and media America may be seen in the ease with which we have fallen into similar errors in Iraq.  In addition, many Vietnam veterans still live with the unhealed contradictions of their personal experience. 

 

Another kind of psychological legacy exists for Vietnamese both within and outside the country. For cultural or political reasons, people in Vietnam have not spoken much to Americans of the suffering experienced by themselves and their families due to the war.  One Vietnamese friend, a high ranking diplomat, remarked with apparent casualness that he had lost his father to the French and his mother to US bombing after her evacuation from Hanoi.  I do not expect, or advise, that every conversation between American and Vietnamese feature a review of grievances from the past, but I do wonder what feelings have been repressed and if there is a cost of doing so.

 

Similarly, Vietnamese now living in the US carry deep feelings of loss and sorrow.  For older people that includes the abrupt tearing away of their lives from the language, culture and land of their ancestors.  More specific grievances include war time deaths and injuries brought about by the other side and post-war suffering in reeducation camps or during the refugee experience on the seas and in third countries.  

 

More profoundly, victors in revolutionary or civil wars in any country seldom find a way to both honor the value of their own sacrifice and accomplishment while acknowledging that those they defeated often also believed they fought for reasons of principle and as courageously.  (Do veterans from the north and the National Liberation Front reconcile with ARVN veterans as readily as they do with American veterans?)

 

4)      What can and should be done to promote understanding of the American public on the Vietnam War?

The nature of the Vietnam debate in the campaign, the role of religious evangelical votes for Bush, and the conservative shift of the Congress will bring new challenges to Vietnamese leaders and institutions and American friends of Vietnam.  Some of my colleagues may believe, with more wisdom than I, that the problem will more be one of inattention than of outright hostility.

 

Certainly American policymakers and the public will be preoccupied by the anti-terrorism war with Islamic extremists, the growing quagmire of Iraq, potential confrontations over nuclear weapons with Iran and North Korea, and the leftward tendency in Latin America, especially of oil rich Venezuela and obstinately independent Cuba. 

 

However, diligent efforts by Vietnam and its friends are needed to fend off political attacks seeking to undermine or roll back the notable achievements of the past decade, including on the economic front through the erection of barriers to products like catfish, shrimp and textiles.

 

These issues must be addressed on their own merits.  Nevertheless, deepening American understanding of the Vietnamese perception of the war informs the context in which more topical issues are debated, even if historical factors are never explicitly mentioned.

 

The Government of Vietnam, and affiliated party and mass organization groups need to commit serious financial and human resources to getting their message out. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5)       What should be main messages to the American public on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the end of the War?

 

“Facing the past helps us move into the future.”

 

Finally, I wanted to touch on two projects my organization is considering.  I encourage your comments during the conference or directly to Andrew Wells-Dang, our resident representative, afterwards.

 

First, we are exploring the idea of a thirtieth/tenth anniversary reunion tour.  Our primary goal for participation would be veterans of the anti-war movement, and their children, who have never visited post war Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  In addition to seeing, feeling, tasting and touching, we would like them to meet with retired and still serving officials and others in the three countries who can help them understand what it meant for the war to end, the problems that were faced, the successes and failures of post-war solutions, the process of renovation, the effect of US normalization of diplomatic and economic relations, legacies of war, contemporary society and challenges of the future.

 

We believe the tour can not only be an opportunity for personally closing the circle, but also the base of a new network of people who care about US-Vietnam relations.

 

Second, we are discussing a conference in Washington on lessons and legacies of the war in Indochina.  This could take place in June or July (the tenth anniversary of normalization) and would involve individuals such as those who joined the reunion tour and representatives of NGOs, universities, foundations and businesses with established programs here.  While the primary focus would be on Indochina, one session would be devoted to looking at the lessons for Iraq and other potential international conflicts.