[See a petition in support of this lawsuit.]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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THE VIETNAM ASSOCIATION FOR
VICTIMS
OF AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN, PHAN
THI PHI PHI,
NGUYEN VAN QUY, Individually and
as Parent and
Natural Guardian of NGUYEN
QUANG TRUNG and
NGUYEN THI THUY NGA, His Children, and 04 CV ______
DUONG QUYNH HOA, Individually
and as
Administratrix of the Estate
of Her Deceased Child,
HUYNH TRUNG SON, On Behalf of
Themselves and
Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT
-
against -
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, MONSANTO JURY
TRIAL
COMPANY, MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY, DEMANDED
PHARMACIA CORPORATION,
HERCULES
INCORPORATED, OCCIDENTAL
CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, ULTRAMAR DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CORPORATION, MAXUS
ENERGY
CORPORATION, THOMPSON HAYWARD
CHEMICAL COMPANY, HARCROS
CHEMICALS
INC., UNIROYAL, INC.,
UNIROYAL CHEMICAL,
INC., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL
HOLDING
COMPANY, UNIROYAL CHEMICAL
ACQUISITION CORPORATION,
C.D.U. HOLDING,
INC., DIAMOND SHAMROCK
AGRICULTURAL
CHEMICALS, INC., DIAMOND
SHAMROCK
CHEMICALS, DIAMOND SHAMROCK
CHEMICALS COMPANY, DIAMOND
SHAMROCK
CORPORATION, DIAMOND SHAMROCK
REFINING AND MARKETING
COMPANY,
OCCIDENTAL ELECTROCHEMICALS
CORPORATION, DIAMOND ALKALI
COMPANY,
ANSUL, INCORPORATED, HOOKER
CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, HOOKER CHEMICAL
FAR EAST
CORPORATION, HOOKER CHEMICALS
&
PLASTICS CORP., AMERICAN HOME
PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, WYETH,
HOFFMAN-TAFF
CHEMICALS, INC., CHEMICAL
LAND HOLDINGS,
INC., T-H AGRICULTURE &
NUTRITION
COMPANY, INC., THOMPSON
CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, RIVERDALE
CHEMICAL
COMPANY, ELEMENTIS CHEMICALS
INC.,
UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY,
INC.,
SYNTEX AGRIBUSINESS INC., and
“ABC
CHEMICAL COMPANIES
1-50",
Defendants.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This
is a civil action brought by Vietnamese nationals and a Vietnamese organization
against corporations based in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and 18 U.S.C. § 2441 for violations of international
law and war crimes, and under the common law for products liability, negligent
and intentional torts, civil conspiracy, public nuisance and unjust enrichment,
seeking money damages for personal injuries, wrongful death and birth defects
and seeking injunctive relief for environmental contamination and disgorgement
of profits. The claims arise out of the
defendants’ manufacture and supply of herbicides which were sprayed, stored and
spilled in Vietnam from 1961-1975 and which have caused death and injury to the
plaintffs and the class they represent, and have contaminated many regions of
that country.
JURSIDICTION AND VENUE
2. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA); 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (Diversity Jursidiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (Regulation of Commerce) and 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal Question). To
the extent the plaintiffs’ claims are governed by State law, this Court should
exercise pendent jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
3. Venue
is vested in the Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Order of the MDL panel).
JURY DEMAND
4. Plaintiffs
demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable in this action.
PARTIES
5. Plaintiff
THE VIETNAM ASSOCIATION FOR VICTIMS OF AGENT
ORANGE/DIOXIN
is a Vietnamese not-for-profit, non-governmental organization whose membership
consists of victims of exposure to herbicides used during the war with the
United States as well as donors, who are honorary members. The purpose of the organization is to raise
funds to pay for treatment and care of victims and to fund environmental
remediation and abatement of contaminated areas. The organization is run by an executive board consisting of
Vietnamese victims, attorneys, medical and scientific researchers, as well as
prominent people from other disciplines.
6. Plaintiffs
PHAN THI PHI PHI, NGUYEN VAN QUY, NGUYEN
QUANG
TRUNG, NGUYEN THI THUY NGA, DUONG QUYNH HOA, HUYNH TRUNG SON are nationals and
residents of Vietnam.
7. Plaintiff
NGUYEN VAN QUY is the father of plaintiffs NGUYEN
QUANG
TRUNG and NGUYEN THI THUY NGA, who are minors under the age of 18 years.
8. Plaintiff
DUONG QUYNH HOA, is the Administratrix of the Estate of
Her
Deceased Child, HUYNH TRUNG SON.
9. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
THE
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
10. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
MONSANTO
COMPANY, was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does business in
the State of New York.
11. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
MONSANTO
CHEMICAL COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
12. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
PHARMACIA
CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does business in
the State of New York.
13. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HERCULES
INCORPORATED was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does business in
the State of New York.
14. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
OCCIDENTAL
CHEMICAL CORPORATION, was and still is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of New York that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
15. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
ULTRAMAR
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact
does business in the State of New York.
16. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
MAXUS
ENERGY CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
17. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
THOMPSON
HAYWARD CHEMICAL COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of Missouri that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
18. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HARCROS
CHEMICALS INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Kansas that is registered to do business or in fact does business
in the State of New York.
19. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
UNIROYAL,
INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of
New Jersey that is registered to do business or in fact does business in the
State of New York.
20. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
UNIROYAL
CHEMICAL, INC., was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
21. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
UNIROYAL
CHEMICAL HOLDING COMPANY, was and still
is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware that is
registered to do business or in fact does business in the State of New York.
22. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
UNIROYAL
CHEMICAL ACQUISITION CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of the State of New Jersey that is registered to do business or
in fact does business in the State of New York.
23. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
C.D.U.
HOLDING, INC., was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
24. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
SHAMROCK AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, INC. was and still is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do
business or in fact does business in the State of New York.
25. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CHEMICALS, was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
26. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CHEMICALS COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact
does business in the State of New York.
27. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CORPORATION, was and still is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
28. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
SHAMROCK REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY was and still is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do
business or in fact does business in the State of New York.
29. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
OCCIDENTAL
ELECTROCHEMICALS CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact
does business in the State of New York.
30. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
DIAMOND
ALKALI COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
31. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
ANSUL,
INCORPORATED was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does business in
the State of New York.
32. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HOOKER
CHEMICAL CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of New York that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
33. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HOOKER
CHEMICAL FAR EAST CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of New York that is registered to do business or in fact
does business in the State of New York.
34. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HOOKER
CHEMICALS & PLASTICS CORP. was and still is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of the State of New York that is registered to do business or in
fact does business in the State of New York.
35. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
AMERICAN
HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, was and
still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware
that is registered to do business or in fact does business in the State of New
York.
36. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
WYETH
was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of
Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does business in the
State of New York.
37. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
HOFFMAN-TAFF
CHEMICALS, INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Missouri that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
38. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
CHEMICAL
LAND HOLDINGS, INC., was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
39. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
T-H
AGRICULTURE & NUTRITION COMPANY, INC. was and still is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do
business or in fact does business in the State of New York.
40. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
THOMPSON
CHEMICAL CORPORATION was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
41. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
RIVERDALE
CHEMICAL COMPANY was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
42. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant
ELEMENTIS CHEMICALS INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
43. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant UNITED
STATES RUBBER COMPANY, INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of New York that is registered to do business or in fact
does business in the State of New York.
44. Upon
information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, defendant SYNTEX
AGRIBUSINESS INC. was and still is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Delaware that is registered to do business or in fact does
business in the State of New York.
45. Some
or all of the above-listed defendants are successors-in-interest, parent
companies, subsidiaries or otherwise associated with or related in interest
with the main actors named as defendants herein such that they are liable for
the conduct the said main actor defendants.
46. The
defendants “ABC CHEMICAL COMPANIES 1-100,” names fictitious, actual names and
number of such entities being unknown to plaintiffs, are companies which
manufactured and supplied herbicides for use in the war with Vietnam from 1961
to 1975, or their successors-in-interest for liability purposes.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Herbicidal Warfare in Vietnam
47. In
1961, the Kennedy Administration inherited a deteriorating situation for the
United States in Vietnam, and turned its attention to how the United States
might succeed in propping up the government of the Republic of Vietnam (in the
south–hereinafter “R.V.”) and in gaining a wartime advantage over the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (in the north–hereinafter “D.R.V.”) and the
National Liberation Front (hereinafter “NLF”).
Specific consideration was given to how modern technology might aid the
war effort.
48. The U.S. government, with the
cooperation of the R.V. government, implemented a program to spray herbicides
in Southeast Asia. The military code
name for the entire herbicide operation was “Operation Trail Dust,” and it included
the spraying of herbicides by airplane, by helicopter, by truck, by boat, and
by soldiers on foot. United States Air
Force (hereinafter “USAF”) aircraft, pursuant to an operation originally
codenamed “Operation Hades” and later renamed “Operation Ranch Hand,” dispersed
more than 95% of all herbicides used in Operation Trail Dust.
49. The
purpose of the spraying was twofold: (a) to defoliate forests and mangroves to
destroy the vegetative cover used by the D.R.V. and NLF troops for concealment,
and (b) to destroy crops to deprive them of food. The spraying lasted from 1961 until the end of the war in 1975.
50. In
August through December of 1961, U.S. military personnel using R.V. aircraft
conducted limited but successful tests in the spraying of herbicides over
southern Vietnam.
51. On
or about November 30, 1961, President Kennedy approved a joint recommendation
of the Department of State and the Department of Defense to initiate a large
scale herbicidal warfare program. Both
Departments advocated the use of herbicides for defoliation only, apparently
recognizing that the destruction of enemy crops was a clear violation of
international law and a war crime.
52. The
first major herbicide shipment arrived in Vietnam in January 1962. In September 1962 defoliation operations
commenced, and in November 1962 crop destruction operations commenced. For one year after President Kennedy
approved the herbicidal warfare program, the spraying of all targets required prior
approval from the White House. In late
1962, authority for defoliation targets only was delegated to the U.S.
Ambassador to the R.V. It was not until
1963 that authority for crop destruction targets was delegated by the White
House to the Ambassador.
53. U.S. government policy initially
emphasized that the U.S. military was merely assisting the R.V. government in
the herbicide program. A 1962 pact
assigned the ownership of the herbicides to the R.V. government once they were
delivered, and R.V. soldiers handled the loading and transportation of the
herbicides. The plans for herbicide use
were coordinated by the US Embassy to the R.V., the U.S. Military Assistance
Command of Vietnam and a subdivision of the Saigon General Staff (of the R.V.
government) codenamed “Committee 202.”
54. The
USAF aircraft used to spray the herbicides were C-123 aircraft which were
camouflaged and equipped with removable identification insignia. When performing crop destruction missions,
the aircraft bore R.V. insignia, the USAF flight crews wore civilian clothing
and were accompanied by a R.V. army crew member, pursuant to a U.S. Department
of Defense concept codenamed “Farmgate.”
55. The
use of herbicides escalated in late 1964 as the war escalated. Controls and limitation on spraying were
gradually relaxed and the areas sprayed were expanded. A frequent target of the
Ranch Hand operation was the complex of roads and footpaths in southern Vietnam
used as a supply route by D.R.V. and NLF personnel, commonly known as the “Ho
Chi Minh Trail.”
56. The use of herbicides for crop
destruction also gradually expanded, and in 1965 alone, 45% of the total
spraying was designed to destroy crops.
The crop destruction included the spraying of fields suspected of being
used by the NLF, however, fields used exclusively by civilians were also
frequently sprayed. In 1967 alone at
least 20 million litres were sprayed--85% for defoliation purposes and 15% for
crop destruction.
57. Between
1961 and 1971, at least 19,905 sorties were run by the USAF. 1-34 sorties were run daily, with a daily
average of 10.7 sorties. 1968 and 1969 were the peak years for herbicide
spraying under Ranch Hand. A recent
study based on US government documents and using sophisticated mapping
techniques has estimated that the total volume of herbicides procured and
sprayed from 1961-1971 alone exceeded 76 million litres.
The
Herbicides Used
58. Various
herbicides were used for defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam. The different types of herbicides were
identified by code names referring to the color of the band around the
herbicide container. These included
Agent Blue (cacodylic acid), Agent White (a mixture of 80% tri-isopropanol
amine salt of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and picloram), Agent
Purple (a formulation of 50% n-butyl ester of 2,4-D, 30% n- butyl ester of
2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) and 20% isobutyl ester of 2,4-D),
Agent Green (100% n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T) Agent Pink (60% n-butyl ester of
2,4,5-T and 40% isobutyl ester of 2,4,5-T) and Agent Orange (50-50 mixture of
the n-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T).
59. Approximately
65% of the herbicides contained 2,4,5-T.
A synthetic contaminant and unavoidable by-product of the manufacture of
2,4,5-T is TCDD, also known as dioxin.
Dioxin is one of the most toxic chemicals known to science.
60. From
1962 to 1965, Agents Purple, Pink and Green were used. From 1965 to 1970, Agents Orange, White and
Blue were used, and from 1970 to 1971, only Agents White and Blue were used in
the defoliation program. Agent Orange
was the most extensively used herbicide in Vietnam.
61. Phenoxy
herbicides such as Agents Orange, Purple, White, Pink and Green are chemical
growth regulators that kill certain plants by inducing malfunctions in the
biological growth process. Agents Pink and Green were rarely used after Agent
Orange was introduced in early 1965. Agent Orange was an effective defoliant
when used in heavy concentrations and was used on a wide variety of woody and
broadleaf herbaceous plants, causing discoloration and dropping of leaves.
Agent White was especially useful in killing conifers. Agent Blue was used
primarily for crop destruction.
62. The
delivery system initially used aboard the Ranch Hand C-123s to spray the
herbicides was the Hourglass spray system, also known as MC-1. Although the Hourglass system was normally
capable of distributing herbicide at a rate of 1 gallon per acre, it was
modified, for Ranch Hand operations, to distribute 3 gallons per acre. In 1966, the Hourglass system was replaced
in all C-123s by a modular spray system.
The
International Controversy
63. From
the inception of Operations Trail Dust and Ranch Hand, opposition to the
herbicidal warfare program sprang up from many different quarters. Several influential people in the U.S. State
Department, such as Roger Hilsman and W. Averell Harriman, were opposed to the
spraying from the outset, citing its possible effects on the civilian
population of Vietnam and the risk that the U.S. would be perceived as a
barbaric imperialist.
64. In
1963 a series of articles written by journalist Richard Dudman were published
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and other newspapers criticizing the herbicidal
warfare program as constituting “dirty-war tactics,” including the spraying of
poison to destroy rice fields. These
articles prompted Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin to write to
President Kennedy to urge him to renounce the use of herbicides in Vietnam,
calling them chemical weapons.
65. In
1964, an article published in the Washington Post described the accidental
spraying of a friendly village in southern Vietnam which destroyed the rice and
pineapples upon which people depended for their livelihoods. The following day, the Washington Post editorial
called for an end to the use of herbicides in Vietnam, because herbicides were
too unselective and posed a risk to the civilian population.
66. As
early as 1964, the Federation of American Scientists had expressed opposition
to herbicides in Vietnam on the grounds that the United States was capitalizing
on the war as an opportunity to experiment in biological and chemical warfare.
67. In
January 1966, a group of about 30 Boston scientists protested crop destruction
as a barbarous and indiscriminate attack on both combatants and noncombatants.
68. In
1967, a petition signed by more than 5,000 scientists, including 17 Nobel
laureates and 129 members of the National Academy of Sciences, urging President
Johnson to stop using antipersonnel and anticrop chemicals in Vietnam was
received by the President’s Science Advisor and received wide publicity.
69. Also
in 1967, the RAND Corporation issued two reports criticizing the herbicidal
warfare program because it was eliminating the food supply upon which
Vietnamese farmers depended.
70. Also
in 1967, the American Association for the Advancement of Science urged the U.S.
Department of Defense to study the long-range ecological consequences of the
herbicidal warfare program. Although the Department of Defense commissioned the
Midwest Research Institute to study based upon a survey of existing literature
which opined that toxicity to animals and people should not be factor of real
concern, the National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed this report
concluded that there was insufficient existing research on the herbicidal
warfare program to draw firm conclusions.
71. In
1965 the National Cancer Institute had contracted with the Bionetics Research
Laboratory to study the toxicity of certain herbicides and pesticides. In 1966, a preliminary report indicated that
2,4,5-T and 2,4-D could cause malformed offspring and stillbirths in mice.
These findings were not released publicly until 1969, when they were
inadvertently leaked to (Ralph) “Nader’s Raiders.”
72. The
herbicidal warfare program was considered by most of the international
community to be a violation of international law and a war crime. As early as 1966, resolutions were
introduced at the United Nations charging the United States with violations of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
73. In
1969, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution No. 2603-A,
restating that the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical or
biological agents against plants in international armed conflicts. The resolution specifically declared as a
violation of that treaty, the use of any chemical agents of warfare, whether
gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic
effects on man, animals or plants. The
United States did not accept this interpretation and voted against the
resolution. The resolution was adopted,
however, on December 16, 1969 by a vote of 80 to 3 with 36 abstentions.
74. On
April 15, 1970, the U.S. Secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare,
Agriculture and the Interior issued a joint statement suspending domestic use
of herbicides containing 2,4,5-T except for limited non-crop uses. That same
day, the U.S. Department of Defense suspended military use of 2,4,5-T,
including Agent Orange, "pending a more thorough evaluation of the
situation." Thereafter, herbicide spraying for defoliation continued for a
short while, using Agent White. Crop destruction, utilizing Agents White and Blue,
continued throughout 1970. In January 1971, the last Ranch Hand mission took
place.
75. After
the U.S. officially ended Operation Ranch Hand in 1971, large quantities of
herbicides were left behind, in the possession of the R.V. government. Upon information and belief, more barrels of
herbicides were provided by the U.S. and the defendants to the R.V. government
in 1973 and 1974.
76. Upon
information and belief, the R.V. government continued to use the herbicides in
their war effort until it collapsed in 1975.
77. On
April 8, 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11850 which declared: “The
United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of
herbicides in war, except under regulations applicable to their domestic use,
for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their
immediate defensive perimeters. . .”
78. During
the course of Operation Trail Dust, Operation Ranch Hand and the final period
of the war, large numbers of Vietnamese combatants and civilians were directly
exposed to herbicides by spraying. In
addition to those who were sprayed directly with the herbicides, many more were
exposed indirectly, by coming into contact with plants and water that were contaminated. It has been estimated that up to 4 million
Vietnamese were exposed to herbicides during the period 1961-1971.
79. In
addition, residues from herbicides transported, loaded and stored at or near
USAF bases in Vietnam, such as Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Phu Cat, the Aluoi
and Asau Valleys have led to contamination of the groundwater and food chains
in the surrounding areas, resulting in exposure to herbicides by civilians that
continues to this very day. The use of
herbicides in the war in Vietnam has been called the “largest chemical warfare
operation in history, producing considerable ecological as well as public
health damage.”
The
Defendants Role: Manufacture and Supply of the Herbicides
80. The
U.S. government asked several chemical manufacturers, including the defendants,
to manufacture and sell it specific phenoxy herbicides for use in the
herbicidal warfare in Vietnam.
81. In
the early 1960's, the U.S. government, pursuant to the Defense Production Act
of 1950, entered into a series of fixed price production, or procurement,
contracts with the defendants. The
contracts instructed the defendants to not to label the contents of the
herbicide containers except by a color-coded three-inch band, in accordance
with the type of herbicide (orange, purple, blue, etc.).
82. Production
of the herbicides began pursuant to the contracts, which were very profitable
for the defendants. Defendants were able to sell to the government as much as
they were able to produce.
83. Defendants
were aware at the time of procurement and production that the herbicides would
be sprayed widely in Vietnam for defoliation and crop destruction purposes, but
did not object to the intended use of their product. Instead they produced and supplied the herbicides knowing they
would be used in herbicidal warfare, in violation of international law.
84. Defendants
were aware at the time of procurement and production that dioxin was an
unavoidable by-product of 2,4,5-T and that dioxin was extremely toxic to
plants, animals and humans but did not object to the intended use of their
product. Instead they produced and
supplied the herbicides knowing they would be used in herbicidal warfare, in
violation of international law.
85. Defendants
continued to produce and supply the herbicides even after they had notice that
the herbicides were being used to destroy plants and crops in violation of
international law.
86. Defendants
continued to produce and supply the herbicides even after they had notice that
dioxin was toxic to plants, animals and humans and that civilians, combatants
and the environment had been adversely affected.
87. Defendants
were aware at the time of procurement and production that even very small
quantities of dioxin in the diet produced adverse health effects in animals,
and that even quantities as low as 5 parts per trillion (ppt) could cause
cancerous conditions in rats when supplied on a daily basis.
88. Defendants
were aware at the time of procurement and production that concentrations of
about 1 part per billion (ppb) could result in premature death from more acute
causes and concentrations above 50 ppb produced rapid signs of acute toxicity
and early death. Researchers had found that lower concentrations of dioxin
produced the same results as higher concentrations, but took longer to do so.
89. At
the time of procurement and production, defendant Dow knew that the dioxin
problem arose during the manufacturing process and that any dioxin produced at
that stage could carry forward into the delivered product.
90. At
the time of procurement and production, defendant Dow knew that in cases of
continuous exposure, dioxin could be hazardous in amounts as low as 1 part per
million (ppm), which was at that time the lowest level at which dioxin could be
readily detected.
91. Defendants
had long known before procurement and production of the hazards associated with
dioxin and that factory workers exposed to dioxin could develop chloracne,
liver damage and other diseases.
92. In
1956, an outbreak of chloracne occurred among workers at a Diamond Alkali plant.
93. In
1949, an accident occurred at Defendant Monsanto’s chemical plant in Nitro,
West Virginia, in which a substance containing dioxin was dispersed throughout
the building, exposing the defendant’s workers to the toxic substance.
94. Many
of the workers began to complain of health problems and developed symptoms of
chloracne and other conditions soon after the accident. A number of the workers were examined and
treated by physicians, and several researchers later studied the exposed
workers for related health effects.
95. By
1952, defendant Monsanto was aware that dioxin was a by-product and contaminant
of 2,4,5-T and was a toxic substance.
96. Defendant
Dow had begun producing 2,4,5-T in 1948.
Dow had developed the “rabbit ear” test in 1945 to determine the
presence of chloracnegens. Dow had
corresponded with German firms concerning the toxicity of the substance in the
1950s and had at that time known of chloracne outbreaks among its own and other
companies’ workers.
97. In
February 1964 at Dow’s plant in Midland, Michigan, more than 40 workers
developed chloracne due to the presence of dioxin, and defendant Dow determined
that dioxin was the chloracnegen.
98. Defendant
Dow knew that dioxin would be present in the herbicides called for by the
procurement contracts in at least the 1 ppm level of sensitivity and based upon
animal tests it knew or should have known that dioxin could have deleterious
effects even below 1 ppm.
99. Defendant
Dow shared this information at a conference it called in March 1965 with the
other defendants. Representatives of defendants Hooker Chemical, Hercules, and
Diamond Alkali were present, and were told that repeat exposure to 1 ppm of
dioxin could be dangerous.
100. Defendant
Dow also informed the other participants at the March 1965 meeting that it had
sampled other companies' herbicides and had found them to contain relatively
high levels of dioxin, and that precautions were necessary to prevent health
hazards.
101. All
of the defendants were aware of the foregoing incidents of dioxin poisoning and
of the fact that dioxin, a dangerous substance was an unavoidable by-product of
2,4,5-T, at the time of procurement and production.
102. The
defendants feared that the government, if it learned of the scope of the problem
with dioxin, might intervene in a way disastrous to the entire herbicide
industry. After the defendants acquired information about the hazards of
dioxin, they became concerned about regulation and interference with the
herbicide industry if the public was made fully aware of the problem. At that time herbicides were being
increasingly used in commercial applications and their manufacture and supply
represented a very profitable enterprise for the Defendants.
103. The
defendants were aware, at the time of procurement and production, of the existence of the vapor phase chromatography
(VPC) method for detecting dioxin in herbicides which was accurate to 1
ppm. The defendants were also aware at
this time of the fact that precautions in production and in filtering out
dioxin could sharply limit the risk of contamination of the final herbicide.
104. However,
the defendants did not take adequate or reasonable measures to reduce the
dioxin content of their products or to otherwise prevent or mitigate their
toxicity to humans who might come into contact with the herbicide, considering
the uses to which it would be put.
105. Neither
did the defendants take adequate or reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate
the disastrous effect of the herbicides on the environment of the regions in
which it would be sprayed.
106. Neither
did the defendants adequately warn the government or the general public about
the hazards of dioxin before or during the time they produced or supplied the
herbicides for the war. In fact the
defendants actively concealed the truth about dioxin from the government and
the general public before and during the time they produced and supplied
herbicides for the war.
Plaintiff PHAN THI PHI PHI
107. On
or about April 1966, plaintiff Phan Thi Phi Phi was a Vietnamese national and a
physician residing in Quang Nam province, in South Vietnam.
108. From
April 1966 through July 1971, Dr. Phi Phi served as Director of Hospital No. 1,
a mobile hospital with different units which moved to various locations in
Quang Nam province and Quang Ngai province in southern Vietnam. The hospital units were often located near
the Ho Chi Minh trail and near various rivers and streams in the said
provinces. Dr. Phi Phi often had to
travel along the Ho Chi Minh trail to visit the different hospital units.
109. As
Director of Hospital No. 1, Dr. Phi Phi supervised the treatment and care of
civilian patients. The hospital also
occasionally treated soldiers with acute conditions.
110. The
hospital staff, including Dr. Phi Phi, and the patients receiving treatment at
the hospital relied upon food they cultivated or found in the nearby valleys
for daily sustenance. They drank water
drawn from streams near the hospital units or near the Ho Chi Minh trail. Among the foods they cultivated and ate were
manioc, rice, corn and other wild fruits and vegetables. They also bought foods like poultry, pigs
and other animals and vegetables from local villagers.
111. Quang
Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, especially near the Ho Chi Minh trail, were two
of the areas heavily sprayed with herbicides manufactured by one, some or all
of the defendants pursuant to operations Trail Dust and Ranch Hand both before
and during the time of Dr. Phi Phi’s residence there. As a result of these operations, the valleys adjacent to the Ho
Chi Minh trail were also heavily exposed to the herbicides, including the
valleys in which Dr. Phi Phi and her colleagues cultivated and collected food
and water.
112. As
a result of exposure to the herbicides, the trees and the fruit and vegetable
plants in those valleys were often leafless, and had ceased to bear fruit.
As a result, Dr. Phi Phi and her colleagues were forced to harvest and
eat the roots of those plants that were edible, such as potato and manioc, not
knowing that those roots, as well as the water from the streams that that they
relied upon for sustenance, had become poisoned by the herbicides. During the entire period she served as
Director of Hospital No. 1, Dr. Phi Phi 9ate food and drank water exposed to
the herbicides.
113. From
1971-1972, Dr. Phi Phi became pregnant three times. Each of those three
pregnancies ended with Dr. Phi Phi suffering a miscarriage in the first
trimester of her pregnancy. Dr. Phi Phi
suffered miscarriages in December 1971, July 1972 and November 1972.
114. In
1973, Dr. Phi Phi became pregnant again.
Although the pregnancy proceeded normally through the first trimester,
on or about July 1973, she again suffered a miscarriage which required
hospitalization.
115. Dr.
Phi Phi’s repeated miscarriages were caused by her exposure to the herbicides
and dioxin through her ingestion of food and water drawn from areas sprayed
with herbicides.
Plaintiffs NGUYEN VAN QUY, NGUYEN QUANG TRUNG
and NGUYEN THI THUY NGA
116. On
or about July 1972 plaintiff Nguyen Van Quy was a Vietnamese national and a
soldier serving in the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. His assignment was the repair of
communications lines.
117. From
April 1972 to July 1972, Nguyen Van Quy’s unit marched to southern Vietnam
along the Ho Chi Minh trail. From July
1972 until September 1972 Nguyen Van Quy was stationed in Bo Ko. He was then
transferred to Quang Ngai where he was stationed from September 1972 to April
1973. From April 1973 until the end of
the war in 1975, he was stationed in Quang Nam, near the Ho Chi Minh
trail. All of the foregoing provinces
were situated in southern Vietnam.
118. During
that time period from 1972 through 1975, he would regularly eat manioc, wild
grass and other plants he found and he would regularly drink water from streams
in areas that had been spayed with herbicide manufactured by one, some or all
of the defendants. He could tell that
an area had been spayed with herbicide because the trees had no leaves, and
when it rained, a very strong and foul odor emanated from the ground for a
brief time.
119. On
or about August of 1972, one day when he was out collecting wild grass to eat,
he came across a barrel which he thought contained oil. Oil was very useful at time for use in
lamps. He pierced the barrel with a
knife and white powdery substance came pouring out, with a very strong and four
odor. Upon information and belief, the
white powdery substance was herbicide manufactured by one, some or all of the
defendants.
120. During
the entire time period that he was stationed in southern Vietnam, Nguyen Van
Quy periodically had headaches and felt exhaustion, and his skin was often
itchy and broke out in rashes. The skin
irritation disappeared after he left Quang Ngai province in 1973, but the
headaches and exhaustion continued and became worse over time.
121. After
the war, Nguyen Van Quy returned to his home in Hai Duong province, in northern
Vietnam, where he rejoined his family on their farm.
122. In
1984, Nguyen Van Quy was married, and his wife became pregnant. Later that year, Mr. Quy moved to Vung Tao,
in southern Vietnam, where he found work as a welder.
123. While
Mr. Quy was working in Vung Tao, his pregnant wife had remained with his family
in Hai Duong. The pregnancy ended in a
stillbirth. The birth was premature and
the fetus was deformed.
124. Because
of the stillbirth and the deformed fetus, Mr. Quy’s wife filed for, and
obtained, a divorce from him.
125. Mr.
Quy continued to work as a welder in Vung Tao for approximately one year, but
had to stop working because of worsening spells of weakness and exhaustion.
126. In
1986, Mr. Quy moved back to his family’s home in Hai Duong province, where he
depended upon his family for financial support because he was too weak to work.
127. In
1987, Mr. Quy was married again, and he moved to Hai Phong City, into the home
of his second wife’s family, upon whom he then depended for financial support.
128. His
second wife soon became pregnant and in 1988, gave birth to their son,
plaintiff Nguyen Quang Trung.
129. Plaintiff
Nguyen Quang Trung was born with spinal, limb and developmental defects. His feet are enlarged and deformed. He is unable to coordinate his legs and
arms. He has a congenital defect of the
spine, which makes it difficult to support his weight. He is developmentally
disabled. As a result of the said conditions, Nguyen Quang Trung is unable to
stand, walk, or use his hands; he is unable care for himself or attend school
or work.
130. Shortly
after Nguyen Quang Trung’s birth, Mr. Quy’s second wife became pregnant again,
and in 1989 she gave birth to a daughter, Plaintiff Nguyen Thi Thuy Nga, who
was born developmentally disabled and was also born deaf and dumb. As a result, Nguyen Thi Thuy Nga cannot
attend school or work and she is not self-sufficient.
131. Mr.
Quy’s spells of weakness and exhaustion worsened, and in September 2003, he
went to Viet Tiep hospital in Hai Phong City to seek treatment, where he was
diagnosed with stomach cancer and liver cancer, and discharged.
132. On
or about October 20, 2003, Mr. Quy had difficulty breathing and was taken by
ambulance to Military Hospital 108 in Hanoi, where he was diagnosed with lung
cancer.
133. Mr.
Quy has received treatment for cancer, including chemotherapy, which has caused
him to lose hair. He is now very weak and has difficulty breathing, and is
often home-bound. Although Mr. Quy
receives disability payments from the government, they are insubstantial and
his wife supports their family by making and selling incense from their
home. Mr. Quy and his in-laws care for
Nguyen Quang Trung and Nguyen Thi Thuy Nga at their home. Both of Mr. Quy’s children are unable to
care for themselves and require constant care and attention from Mr. Quy and
his family.
134. Mr.
Quy’s diseases and conditions and his children’s birth defects and conditions
were caused by his exposure to the herbicides and dioxin through his ingestion
of food and water drawn from areas sprayed with herbicides and his direct
contact with the herbicides.
Plaintiff DUONG QUYNH HOA
135. In
1964, plaintiff Duong Quynh Hoa was a Vietnamese national and a physician
residing in the city of Saigon in southern Vietnam.
136. During
that time, she travelled often to the cities Bien Hoa and Song Be, which were
heavily contaminated with herbicides manufactured by one, some or all of the
defendants.
137. From
1968-1976, plaintiff Dr. Hoa served as Minister of Health of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. During that time she resided in
Tay Ninh province.
138. During
her time in Tay Ninh, she was told several times to cover her head with plastic
bags because US aircraft were spraying chemicals. During that time she also came across a container of the herbicides
manufactured by one, some or all of the defendants which had been dropped by US
aircraft.
139. In
May 1970, Dr. Hoa gave birth to a son, plaintiff Huynh Trung Son. Plaintiff Huynh Trung Son was born
developmentally disabled and suffered suffered from epileptic convulsions.
140. Plaintiff
Huynh Trung son died at the age of eight months, from a convulsion.
141. After
the end of the war, Dr. Hoa began to experience itchiness and rashes on her
skin.
142. In
1971, Dr. Hoa became pregnant, but suffered a miscarriage in in July 1971, in
her eighth week of pregnancy.
143. Dr.
Hoa became pregnant again but suffered a miscarriage again in January 1972, in
her sixth week of pregnancy.
144. After
the death of her child and her two miscarriages, Dr. Hoa decided not to become
pregnant again.
145. In
1985, after bouts of weakness and fainting spells, Dr. Hoa was diagnosed with
diabetes.
146. In
1998, after feeling a lump in her right breast, Dr. Hoa was diagnosed with
breast cancer and underwent a mastectomy.
147. In
1999, Dr. Hoa was tested for dioxin, which revealed relatively high levels of
the toxin in her blood.
148. Both
plaintiff Duong Quynh Hoa’s diseases and her son Huynh Trung Son’s death were
caused by Dr. Hoa’s exposure to the herbicides manufactured by one, some or all
of the defendants.
The Trade Embargo Against Vietnam 1961-1994
149. Pursuant
to its authority under the Trading With the Enemies Act, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury imposed a trade embargo on Vietnam.
150. The
embargo took effect for nationals of “North Vietnam; i.e., Vietnam north of the
17th parallel” on May 5, 1964.
151. The
embargo took effect for nationals of “South Vietnam; i.e., Vietnam south of the
17th parallel” on April 30, 1975, at 12:00 p.m. e.d.t. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201.
152. The
embargo prohibited most, if not all, types of transactions, trade and transfers
between U.S. nationals and Vietnamese nationals, including those concerning the
“issuance, docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judgment, decree, attachment,
execution, or other judicial or administrative process or order, or the service
of any garnishment; the acquisition of any interest of any nature whatsoever by
reason of a judgment or decree of any foreign country. . .” 31 C.F.R. §
500.310.
153. The
embargo also prohibited U.S. nationals and Vietnamese nationals from entering
into any contracts for services and from engaging in any dealings in any
property, whether “real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or
interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.” 31 C.F.R. § 500.311.
154. The
U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam was partially lifted on or about February 7,
1994, and fully lifted on or about March 9, 1995.
155. On
January 28, 1995, an Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Concerning the
Settlement of Certain Property Claims entered into force. However, this
agreement does not cover claims concerning personal or other injuries resulting
from herbicide exposure, and no assistance has been given by the U.S.
government towards compensating the victims of the herbicidal warfare or
cleaning up the environment in Vietnam.
Recent Studies
156. The
Agent Orange Act of 1991, passed by the U.S. Congress, directed the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs to request that the Institute of Medicine of National
Academy of Sciences (“IOM”) conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of
available scientific and medical information regarding the health effects of
exposure to the herbicides used in Vietnam and their components, including
dioxin. In 1992 the IOM signed an
agreement with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to perform the study.
157. The
IOM published the results of said study in 1994 and has periodically updated
the study thereafter. The published studies and updates have included
conclusions and recommendations and have found an association between herbicide
exposure and many different types of diseases and defects.
158. The
IOM further recommended that the Department of Veterans Affairs develop
historical reconstruction methods for characterizing exposure to herbicides in
Vietnam. Pursuant to that
recommendation a team of scientists at Columbia University led by Jeanne Mager
Stellman prepared a study and report, published in the scientific journal
Nature on April 17, 2003. This report
found that “Large numbers of Vietnamese civilians appear to have been directly
exposed to herbicidal agents, some of which were sprayed at levels at least an
order of magnitude greater than for similar U.S. domestic purposes,” and
estimated that two to four million Vietnamese people were affected by herbicide
exposure.
159. In
2002, a study performed and published by a team of Vietnamese and Canadian
scientists led by Wayne Dwernychuk of Hatfield Consultants Ltd. in the
scientific journal Chemosphere (Chemosphere 47 (2002) 117-137) reported that
the Aluoi Valley of central Vietnam had sustained extensive environmental
contamination by dioxin, and theorized that the contamination resulted from the
spraying, storage and transfer of the herbicides used in the war with the
United States, and that “the Aluoi Valley is a microcosm of southern Vietnam,
where numerous reservoirs of (dioxin) exist in the soil of former military
installations south of the former demilitarized zone.”
160. In
2003, a study by a team of researchers led by Arnold Schecter, a professor of
environmental sciences at The University of Texas, published in the August 2003
issue of the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, found dioxin
contamination in the environment and food chain in Bien Hoa City in southern
Vietnam. The study specifically found
that dioxin continues to poison people in exposed areas through the intake of
contaminated food.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
161. The
acts of defendants described herein were inflicted under color of law and under
color of official authority and in conspiracy with and on behalf of those
acting under color of official authority, and were inflicted deliberately and
intentionally.
162. The
acts of defendants and the injuries sustained by plaintiffs and their
next-of-kin described herein were part of a pattern and practice of systematic
human rights violations designed, implemented and directed by defendants and
their agents, from which the defendants received profits and were greatly
enriched.
163. The
defendants conspired with the governments of the U.S. and the R.V. to commit
the various violations of international law and laws of the United States, Vietnam
and the State of New York, and all acts of the defendants described herein were
performed in furtherance of the conspiracy to violate the rights of the
plaintiffs and did, in fact, advance the objectives of the conspiracy and
assist in the commissions of said violations of law.
164. As
a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiffs have
suffered and will continue to suffer physical injuries, pain and suffering and
extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress, plaintiffs have
incurred and will continue to incur medical expenses, and plaintiffs have
suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of their means of economic
support. Plaintiffs are thereby
entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.
165. The
conduct of defendants and their agents and employees, as described herein, was
malicious, fraudulent and/or oppressive and done with a willful and conscious
disregard for plaintiff’s rights and for the deleterious consequences of the
defendants’ actions, and was motivated solely by the desire for profit at the
expense of plaintiff’s lives, health and well-being. Consequently, plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages from
each of the defendants.
166. As
a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ conduct, the environment in
Vietnam has been become contaminated with toxic substances, and will require
remediation and abatement. Plaintiffs
are therefore entitled to injunctive relief, in the form of an Order of this
Court directing the defendants to provide for said remediation and abatement.
167. The
defendants profited from acts which constitute war crimes and violations of
international law, as well as intentional torts under the common law, and have
been unjustly enriched thereby.
Defendants should not profit from these heinous acts, and plaintiffs are
therefore entitled to injunctive relief, in the form of an Order of this Court
directing the defendants to provide an accounting of the profits received by
the defendants from the manufacture and supply of the herbicides used in the
war in Vietnam, and to pay to the plaintiffs a sum of money equivalent to the
entire amount of said profits, with interest from the date of the earliest
procurement contracts.
168. Defendants
are jointly and severally liable for all of the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs. In the alternative,
defendants are liable proportionally for the plaintiff’s damages according to
their proportional market share of the herbicides they manufactured and supplied
which were used in the herbicidal warfare.
169. Defendants’
actions have violated, and plaintiffs causes of action arise from, the
following laws, agreements, conventions, resolutions and treaties, which
constitute specific examples of the applicable law of nations or customary
international law:
A. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350;
B. Torture Victim Protection Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350;
C. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441;
D. 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
E. Article 23 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18
October 1907;
F. Geneva Convention relative to
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed at Geneva 12 August 1949;
G. Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, signed and entered into force
August 8, 1945;
H. United Nations Charter, signed at San
Francisco on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24, 1945;
I. United Nations General Assembly
Resolution No. 2603-A (1969)
J. Customary international law;
K. Common law of the United States of
America;
L. The laws of Vietnam;
M. Common law of the State of New York,
including but not limited to products liability, assault and battery,
negligence, recklessness, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, unjust
enrichment, and public nuisance.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
170. Plaintiffs
bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other Vietnamese nationals
who were exposed to herbicides used in the war with the United States at any
time and were in any way injured, became ill, suffered from birth defects, or
died as a result. This action is not
brought on behalf of those persons exposed who may manifest illness or injury
in the future. The plaintiffs propose
organizing the class into subclasses for each type of disease or defect, e.g.
one subclass for lung cancer victims, one for type II diabetes victims, one for
children with limb reduction birth defects, one for wrongful death victims,
etc.
171. Upon
information and belief, this class of persons consists of not less than two to
four million persons, and the class is thus so numerous that individual joinder
of all members is impracticable under the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
(a)(1). As demonstrated by the factual
allegations herein, the class consists of millions of persons. While the exact number and identities of the
class members are unknown at this time, such information can be ascertained
through appropriate investigation and discovery.
172. There
are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members or subclasses. Common questions of law and fact include the
following:
A. Whether the plaintiffs state a valid claim under the ATCA, the TVPA and 18 U.S.C. § 2441 for violations of international law and war crimes and whether defendants were complicit in those crimes;
B. Whether the statute of limitations for
plaintiffs’ claims should be tolled because of the war and the trade embargo
imposed upon Vietnam;
C. Whether the Eastern District of New York
is the proper venue for the plaintiffs’ claims;
D. Whether the herbicides manufactured and
supplied by defendants generally cause the illnesses and injuries alleged by
the plaintiffs;
E. Whether the defendants knew or should
have known of the dangers of the dioxin present in their herbicides and whether
they failed to disclose or fraudulently concealed information about the dangers
in violation of law; and
F. Whether the defendants are entitled to
immunity for their actions under the “government contractor defense,”
notwithstanding the principles enunciated by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg.
Only the amount of individual damages sustained by
each class member will vary.
173. The claims of the named plaintiffs
are typical of the claims of the above-described class in that all of the
members of the class have been similarly affected by the defendants’ common
course of conduct, and the members of each subclass have identical claims
against the defendants.
174. The
named plaintiffs and representatives for each subclass will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the members of the class, in that their
interests are not adverse to the interests of the other members of the
class. The named plaintiffs have
retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of complex litigation and
class action litigation.
175. A class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy
under the standards of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(3). The individual class
members do not have the resources to pursue individual litigations, and even if
they did, such litigation would unduly burden the courts. Individual litigation would magnify the delay
and expense to all parties in resolving the controversies engendered by the
defendant chemical companies’ common course of conduct. The class action device allows a single
court to provide the benefits of unitary adjudication, judicial economy and the
fair and equitable hearing of all of plaintiffs’ claims in a single forum. The conduct of this action as a class action
conserves the resources of the parties and of the judicial system, and protects
the rights of each class member. For
most, if not all, class members, a class action is the only feasible mechanism
that allows them an opportunity for legal redress and justice.
176. This action is also certifiable
under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(1) and/or 23(b)(2) because:
A. Inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class or each subclass would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants toward that
class;
B. Adjudications of individual class
members’ claims with respect to the defendants would, as a practical matter, be
dispositive of the interests of other members not party to the adjudications,
and could substantially impair or impede the ability of other class members to
protect their interests;
C. With respect to each class member, the
defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
that class, thereby making equitable relief with respect to the class as a
whole appropriate.
177. The named plaintiffs bring this
action and all claims for relief herein on behalf of themselves individually
and all persons similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 against defendants herein.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(War Crimes)
178. Plaintiffs repeat each and every
allegation previously made herein.
179. The acts described herein against
Plaintiffs constitute violations of the laws and customs of war, also known as
war crimes, which prohibit the use of any chemical agents of warfare, whether
gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic
effects on man animals or plants and generally prohibit the poisoning of food
and water supplies in the course of war.
Leaders, organizers, facilitators, conspirators, accomplices
participating in the formulation and execution of these acts are responsible
for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.
180. The acts described herein constitute
war crimes in violation of the ATCA, TVPA, customary international law, the
common law of the United States of America, the common law of the State of New
York, the laws of Vietnam, and the international treaties, agreements,
conventions and resolutions described in paragraph 169 herein.
181. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the war crimes committed
against the plaintiffs.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Crimes Against Humanity)
182. Plaintiffs repeat each and every
allegation previously made herein.
183. The acts described herein against
Plaintiffs constitute crimes against humanity, in violation of customary
international law which prohibits inhumane acts of a very serious nature such
as willful killing and torture and other inhumane acts committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds.
Leaders, organizers, facilitators, conspirators, accomplices
participating in the formulation and execution of these acts are responsible
for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.
184. The acts described herein constitute
crimes against humanity in violation of the ATCA, TVPA, customary international
law, the common law of the United States of America, the common law of the
State of New York, the laws of Vietnam, and the international treaties,
agreements, conventions and resolutions described in paragraph 169 herein.
185. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the crimes against
humanity committed against the plaintiffs.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Torture)
186. Plaintiffs repeat each and every
allegation previously made herein.
187. The acts described herein constitute
torture of the plaintiffs as plaintiffs were placed in great fear for their
lives and were caused to suffer severe physical and psychological abuse and
agony. The tortures of the plaintiffs
as described herein were inflicted deliberately and intentionally for purposes
which included, among others, punishing the victim or intimidating the victim
or third persons.
188. The acts described herein constitute
torture in violation of the ATCA, TVPA, customary international law, the common
law of the United States of America, the common law of the State of New York,
the laws of Vietnam, and the international treaties, agreements, conventions
and resolutions described in paragraph 169 herein.
189. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the torture committed
against the plaintiffs.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Assault and Battery)
190. Plaintiffs repeat each and every
allegation previously made herein.
191. As a result of these acts,
plaintiffs were placed in great fear for their lives and were caused to suffer
severe physical and psychological abuse and agony.
192. Defendants acts were willful,
intentional, wanton, malicious and oppressive.
193. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the assault and battery
committed against the plaintiffs.
194. The acts described herein constitute
assault and battery, actionable under the laws of the United States, Vietnam
and New York.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
195. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
196. The acts described herein constitute
outrageous conduct in violation of all normal standards of decency and were
without privilege or justification.
197. These outrageous acts were intentional
and malicious and done for the purposes of causing plaintiffs to suffer
humiliation, mental anguish and extreme emotional and physical distress.
198. As a result of these acts,
plaintiffs were placed in great fear for their lives and were caused to suffer
severe physical and psychological abuse and agony.
199. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the intentional infliction
of emotional distress of the plaintiffs.
200. Defendants’ outrageous conduct
constitutes the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and is actionable
under the laws of the United States of America, Vietnam and the State of New
York.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)
201. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
202. The actions of defendants, and each
of them, constituted a negligent infliction of emotional distress upon the
plaintiffs.
203. Defendants, and each of them,
carelessly and negligently inflicted said emotional distress through wanton and
reckless conduct in manufacturing and supplying herbicides contaminated with
dioxin for use in the herbicidal warfare.
204. As a direct and legal result of
defendants’ wrongful acts, plaintiffs and plaintiffs immediate family members
have suffered and will continue to suffer significant physical injury, pain and
suffering and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress.
205. The defendants are liable to the
plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants facilitated and conspired with
the government of the United States in bringing about the negligent infliction
of emotional distress of the plaintiffs.
206. Defendants’ conduct constitutes the
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and is actionable under the laws of
the United States of America, Vietnam and the State of New York.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Negligence)
207. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
208. Defendants failed to use ordinary or
reasonable care in order to avoid injury to plaintiffs. Defendants’ negligence was a cause of
injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiffs and their next of kin.
209. As a result of the defendants’
negligence, plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer significant
physical injury and pain and suffering, and plaintiffs have incurred and will
continue to incur medical expenses, loss of earnings and loss of companionship,
care and consortium of their immediate family members.
210. Defendants’ conduct constitutes
negligence, and is actionable under the laws of the United States of America,
Vietnam and the State of New York.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Wrongful Death)
211. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
212. Plaintiff
DUONG QUYNH HOA, is the mother of HUYNH TRUNG SON, now deceased.
213. As a direct result of the
defendants’ acts and omissions and as a result of the death of her son,
plaintiff DUONG QUYNH HOA has sustained pecuniary loss resulting from
loss of society, comfort, attention, services and support of decedent HUYNH
TRUNG SON.
214. The
defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for said conduct in that defendants
facilitated and conspired with the government of the United States in bringing
about the wrongful death of decedent HUYNH TRUNG SON.
215. The
acts described herein constitute wrongful death, actionable under the laws of
the United States of America, Vietnam and the State of New York, and plaintiff
DUONG QUYNH HOA claims for relief on behalf of her deceased son.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Strict Products Liability)
216. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
217. The defendants manufactured and
supplied the herbicides mentioned herein to the U.S. and R.V. governments.
218. At the various times mentioned
herein, the plaintiffs were exposed to said herbicides, as a result of the
spraying, transfer, storage or leakage of said herbicides, and as a result of
said exposure, suffered serious and permanent injuries and loss of life.
219. The negligence of the defendants,
its servants, employees and agents consisted of manufacturing and supplying the
above-mentioned herbicides without making proper and sufficient tests to determine
the dangers and contraindications of the herbicides, in that defendants knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that the
herbicides were unsafe and unfit for use by reason of the dangerous effects to
human health and the environment, in negligently failing to adequately warn the
public and the U.S. and R.V. governments of the dangers and contraindications
of the herbicides, in failing to properly inspect the herbicides, and in
concealing the dangers and contraindications of the herbicide from the public
and from the U.S. and R.V. governments in order to profit from the manufacture
and supply of the herbicides.
220. Upon information and belief, the
defendants conspired and to cooperate and exchange in mutual assistance in
order to bring the above-mentioned herbicides to the market and secure approval
from the appropriate government agencies, although they knew or should have
known that the herbicides contained dioxin and had the potential to become a
cancer producing agent and to cause birth defects and that the herbicides were
otherwise hazardous to human health and to the environment.
221. Upon information and belief, the
defendants, as a result of the conspiracy and mutual cooperation, by
misrepresenting the risks inherent in the use of the herbicides, were
successful in securing approval for the manufacture and supply of the
herbicides by the appropriate government agencies and brought the herbicides to
the market, so as to induce their use in the manner in which it was used by the
U.S. and R.V. governments.
222. By reason of the above, the
defendants are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs under the
doctrine of strict products liability, actionable under the laws of the United
States of America and the State of New York.
223. In the event that the defendants
should not be held jointly and severally liable, then the defendants will be
liable to the plaintiffs because of their participation in the enterprise in
which they participated in manufacturing and supplying the herbicides and in
gaining approval for the marketing and sale of the herbicides.
224. By reasons of the above, plaintiffs
have suffered and will continue to suffer significant physical injury and pain
and suffering, and plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur medical
expenses, loss of earnings and loss of companionship, care and consortium of
their immediate family members.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Public Nuisance)
225. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
226. The defendants manufactured and
supplied herbicides containing dioxin to the U.S. and R.V. governments knowing
that the herbicides would be used in the war in Vietnam.
227. Dioxin is one of the most toxic
chemicals known to science.
228. The herbicides manufactured and
supplied by the defendants were sprayed, transferred, stored and spilled in
Vietnam, contaminating the environment in many regions of that country, and the
defendants conspired with the U.S. and R.V. governments in inflicting said
contamination.
229. Defendants’ acts and omissions
constitute a nuisance, and are injurious to the health and well-being of the
plaintiffs, members of the plaintiff’s organization, members of the plaintiff’s
families as well as neighbors and guests of the plaintiffs.
230. The plaintiffs and their members and
their families have suffered from diseases, defects, ill health and other
conditions as a result of the acts and omissions of the defendants, and have no
adequate remedy at law.
231. Plaintiffs seek an Order of this
Court directing the defendants to provide for the remdiation and abatement of
the contamination caused by the herbicides they manufactured and supplied in
all areas so contaminated in Vietnam.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unjust Enrichment)
232. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
233. Defendants have been unjustly
enriched to the detriment of the plaintiffs because they have received profits
from their unlawful activities which constitute war crimes and crimes against
humanity and which have otherwise violated the laws of the United States of
America, Vietnam and the State of New York, all to the detriment of the
plaintiffs.
234. As a result of defendants’ unjust
enrichment, plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial
upon an accounting of the profits received by the defendants for the
manufacture and supply of the herbicides used in the war in Vietnam, with
interest from the date of the first procurement contract.
235. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy
at law.
236. Plaintiffs seek an Order of this
Court directing defendants to: A. Make
available forthwith all documents or other records needed to determine the
profits received from the production and supply of herbicides used in the war
in Vietnam, B. Produce an accounting of said profits and C. Disgorge said
profits to the plaintiffs, with interest from the date of the first procurement
contract.
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Injunctive and Declaratory Relief)
237. Plaintiffs
repeat each and every allegation previously made herein.
238. As a result of the defendants
conduct, plaintiffs have been injured, and in the absence of injunctive relief,
will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs therefore seek injunctive relief
under the laws of equity to remedy their injuries and prevent any future injury
to their persons, or to all those similarly situated.
239. There is an actual controversy
between all plaintiffs and the defendants, and plaintiffs seek a declaration of
their rights to be free of contamination by toxic substances manufactured and
supplied by the defendants, and each of them.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
240. Wherefore, each and every plaintiff
on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated prays for judgment against
all defendants as follows:
A. For compensatory damages;
B. For punitive damages;
C. For injunctive and declaratory relief,
including, but not limited to, an Order:
i. Directing defendants to provide
environmental remediation and abatement of all contaminated areas in Vietnam;
and
ii. Directing defendants to provide an
accounting of the profits received by the defendants from the manufacture and
supply of the herbicides used in the war in Vietnam, and to pay to the
plaintiffs a sum of money equivalent to the entire amount of said profits, with
interest from the date of the earliest procurement contracts;’
iii. Declaring the actions and omissions of
the defendants to be violations of international law and war crimes; and
D. For costs of suit, attorney’s fees and
such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated:
New York, New York
January 30, 2004
CONSTANTINE P. KOKKORIS
(CK-6045)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
225 Broadway, Suite 612
New York, New York 10007
(212) 349-9340
MOORE
& GOODMAN, LLP
Attorneys
for Plaintiffs
740
Broadway
New
York, New York 10003
(212) 353-9587