Cambodia Prepares for National Elections

by Andrew Wells-Dang

On July 27, Cambodians will go to the polls to select a national government for the third time since the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. International observers, while not expected to be as numerous as in 1993 or 1998, will still play an important role in evaluating the success or failure of the process. As the Fund for Reconciliation & Development prepares to send its own observer delegation to Cambodia, this article presents a critical assessment some of the pre-election complaints that have been registered in the US, examines the role of international observers, and considers some of the possible election outcomes.

The past five years have been in many respects a successful period for Cambodia. With the military threat from the Khmer Rouge finally eliminated, the country has been at peace. The economy has shown remarkable production and export growth. Cambodia’s NGO movement and civil society are thriving and vibrant. Less progress, though notable steps forward, have been made in countering corruption, protecting the environment, and bringing former Khmer Rouge leaders to trial.

The governing coalition of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen and the royalist FUNCINPEC Party led by the speaker of Parliament, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, has defied skeptics and remained stable. The opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), which controls 15 out of 122 seats in Parliament, has performed its role with vigor, and was rewarded at the polls for local commune leadership in February 2002 with an increase from 14% (in 1998) to 17% of the vote. The CPP’s share of the vote also rose substantially in 2002, while FUNCINPEC’s declined.

Divergent Views in Phnom Penh and Washington

A May 2003 survey by the Asia Foundation gives an unmatched view of the mood of the Cambodian electorate several months before the election. Four-fifths of respondents say the country is headed in the right direction and report that people feel free to express their political opinions, up from around two-thirds in a similar survey in 2000. The largest problems respondents identify are poverty (52%) and water issues. 98% plan to vote in the July elections, suggesting an impressive turnout matching or surpassing that of past elections. However, only 29% can point to differences among the three major parties. The survey concludes that “the electorate continues to have relatively limited notions of what elections can do.”

This mixed, though generally upbeat picture contrasts sharply with the widespread concern and alarm about Cambodian elections in Washington. The leading critic of the election process, and of Cambodia’s political system writ large, is Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY). In an extraordinary series of editorials in the Boston Globe, Bangkok Nation and other publications, Sen. McConnell and his chief aide, Paul Grove, have called for “regime change” in the country and exhibited unusually fervent personal animosity towards the Prime Minister. McConnell announced in February 2003 that only a victory by the “democratic opposition” would be an acceptable result, implying that the governing coalition parties running in the election are both undemocratic. “Hun Sen and the ruling party...are part of the problem,” he wrote, while “other Cambodian politicians and political parties...are part of the solution.” On June 26, Sen. McConnell and two colleagues introduced the “Cambodia Democracy and Accountability Act” (S. 1365), which provides for resuming full foreign assistance to Cambodia, provided that elections are “free and fair”—and “that Prime Minister Hun Sen is no longer in power.” (In effect the Senator proposes to use $21.5 million of US government aid to reward, if not to buy, a certain election result.)

Closely associated with McConnell’s views, the International Republican Institute (IRI) is a major funder and supporter of the SRP, though it maintains a greater veneer of objectivity than McConnell himself. An IRI delegation that visited Cambodia in April concluded that “[a] climate of intimidation and fear pervades the pre-electoral environment” and that “time [is] running out” for radical changes in Cambodia’s electoral machinery. In June 10 testimony before Congress, IRI’s program director stated that “IRI is deeply troubled by the preparations for Cambodia’s upcoming elections. While the electoral procedures and administration provide the makings of a technically competent election, the political environment is marred by violence, intimidation, and pervasive restrictions on political expression.”

More moderate US voices are also critical of Cambodia’s election preparations. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has sent several pre-election missions that, while not unremittingly negative, did find that “many of the problems that existed in previous elections...exist today.” On May 20, Sens. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell expressing their “concerns about the situation in Cambodia.” Their letter was followed by a State Department statement on May 30 expressing support for a “credible election process in Cambodia in which all political parties can compete in a safe environment on a level playing field.”

In all cases, the critics’ concerns revolve primarily around two issues. One has to do with political violence and intimidation; the second around equal media access for the major parties. Each of these issues deserves a closer look in comparative perspective with other countries and Cambodia’s own past. The point is not to deny that these (and many other) problems exist in Cambodia; they should be condemned wherever they occur. Many Cambodian voters are also concerned about election-related problems. However, according to the Asia Foundation survey, the percentage who express at least one concern about election fairness declined from 58% in 2000 to 46% in 2003.

Does Violence Intimidate Voters?

There is no question that violence, political or otherwise, is a major problem in Cambodia. In a larger sense, the ongoing level of crime, aggression and corruption in society can be viewed as an unresolved legacy of the Indochina war, the Khmer Rouge period, and the civil war extending into the 1990s. Not only Khmer Rouge leaders, but many lesser criminals, killers and abusers of human rights have gone unpunished. The 1998 national elections happened almost exactly a year after civil infighting between the two ruling parties and several months after a still-unsolved grenade attack against a SRP demonstration. In the aftermath of the 1998 election, both FUNCINPEC and SRP protested the results for several months before the new government was formed. An assassination attempt was made against Hun Sen, possibly by disgruntled former Khmer Rouge.

The past several years have been relatively more calm. There was a bizarre armed attack on Phnom Penh by a California-based group called the “Cambodian Freedom Fighters” in November 2000; its leaders were apprehended and given stiff prison sentences. Political violence did occur in the leadup to the 2002 commune elections, though at a lower level than in 1998. One former FUNCINPEC parliamentarian, Om Radsady, was murdered in December 2002 in what looked like a mafia-style “hit.” Still, it came as a shock when demonstrators protesting alleged anti-Cambodian statements by a Thai actress went on a rampage and burned the Thai Embassy on January 29, 2003, along with other Thai-owned properties in Phnom Penh.

Rumors circulated over who might be responsible for the riots. A May State Department report on the incident labeled Cambodian authorities “irresponsible” and “incompetent” in their use of nationalistic rhetoric and failure to protect Thai property, but did not place blame for the violence on any individual or party. Cambodian officials, including Hun Sen, have commented publicly that they did not expect the demonstrations to become violent.

There is no clear evidence, however, that the January riots have any connection to the July elections. The same is true of some, but not all, other violent incidents in Cambodian society. In 1998, the UN Commission on Human Rights investigated 49 killings and concluded that 16 were clearly politically motivated. Former US Ambassador Kent Wiedemann judged that out of more than 20 killings prior to the 2002 commune elections, 10-15 were political in nature. Most recently, a June 2003 report by Cambodia’s Central Office of Security investigated 16 murders of political party members (nine CPP, five FUNCINPEC, and three SRP) earlier in the year and found that none of them were politically motivated—a finding that might have been politically motivated in itself. Further confusing the issue, the Sam Rainsy Party responded that while they were sure their party’s victims were political, the CPP’s were likely personal.

During this same time period, Bangladesh, East Timor, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka all had higher election-related casualties than Cambodia, in some cases dramatically higher: in May 2001, 100 were killed and 141 injured in a total of 203 violent incidents in the Philippines, and in Bangladesh, sources estimated between 140 and 300 election-related deaths in the three months leading up to the October 2001 elections. (Both of these countries are much larger than Cambodia, so the actual casualty rates are about the same.) But nowhere in the US media or political circles does one hear complaints or hand-wringing about political violence in Bangladesh or the Philippines.

Many other attempts at non-violent intimidation may also occur in Cambodia and other countries. Even presuming that this intimidation is as widespread as critics allege, however, there is no proof that it has a direct result on election behavior. Certainly it does not dissuade people from voting, as Cambodia’s turnouts are among the highest in the world. Presuming that ballots are indeed secret and counting is accurate, as even IRI agrees, it does not follow that voters will be afraid to vote for their party of choice. Indeed, attempts at intimidation could easily backfire if they produce popular anger against the authorities.

Consider an extreme example of fear and intimidation far beyond anything Cambodia has experienced since Khmer Rouge days. In East Timor in 1999, the Indonesian army and its militia surrogates terrorized the country prior to a referendum on independence—which passed by a vote of more than 3 to 1. There is every reason to believe that if Cambodian citizens were in the same conditions, they would act just as courageously. But having been an election observer in Cambodia in 1998 and East Timor in 1999, I can testify that there is no comparison between sporadic, localized violence on one hand and systematic fear, targeted killing and planned destruction on the other. This is not to minimize Cambodia’s problems of violence and impunity, simply to conclude that claims of a “climate” of repression in Cambodia are distorted and exaggerated.

Survey evidence confirms this view. Only 9% of those interviews by the Asia Foundation said they thought the country was going in the wrong direction. Out of those “pessimists,” 11% cited repression and a lack of political freedom as a cause (down from 20% in 2000). Even presuming that there might have been respondents who do feel afraid and were afraid to say so—although the surveyors themselves saw no signs of this—the result is still only a small fraction of the population.

Does Media Bias Affect Election Outcomes?

In the Asia Foundation survey, of the nearly half of respondents who mentioned at least one concern about the upcoming election, the most widely-mentioned worry was vote-buying (26%). This common corrupt practice in many emerging democracies (and some well-established ones) has not, however, elicited large volumes of complaints from international critics; one possible reason for this being that all Cambodian parties might engage in vote-buying relatively equally.

The second-highest concern of Cambodian voters, at 17% (down from 30% in 2000) is media bias. This worry is a major factor in the negative views of IRI, NDI and other critics. While Cambodia’s print media is free and open, including several foreign-owned English-language papers and Khmer-language publications that are harshly critical of the government, most Cambodians outside of major cities do not read these materials. Instead, survey results show, they get their information from radio and television, which are mostly state-owned or supportive of the government.

In a “World Press Freedom Index” assembled (on unclear criteria) by Reporters Sans Frontieres in 2003, Cambodia is ranked “satisfactory,” the same rating as the US, and is given an overall ranking of #71 out of 139, just behind Thailand at 65 and ahead of the Philippines at 89. RSF’s annual report notes that Cambodia is seen as “the good boy of South-East Asia as regards press freedom. Violence against journalists and censorship became more and more infrequent. Nonetheless, almost all of the broadcast media were controlled by the associates of Prime Minister Hun Sen.”

An April 2003 summary by the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (which is funded by USAID and IRI) noted that “all of Cambodia’s major television and radio stations, stateowned or private, dedicated the vast majority of their national news programming to activities of the government, with particular emphasis on completion of public works projects and the ceremonial giving of gifts to the people by CPP politicians.”

The assumptions of this argument are that this media bias is particular to Cambodia and that it has a direct, demonstrable effect on voting behavior. The first assumption is clearly false, while the second has yet to be proven.

Government control of the broadcast media is a pattern in many authoritarian and even democratic societies; the print media is invariably more free. (Consider, for instance, the BBC, which was a government-owned monopoly for decades.) Among the reasons for this are the high capital investment needed for broadcast media, as opposed to the negligible cost of a printing press (or a website). In Southeast Asia, privatized electronic media is a relatively recent occurrence, and only appears in societies that are both industrialized and democratic.

To take several examples from one Western country with a much longer democratic tradition than Cambodia’s, the Federal Communications Commission recently lifted restrictions on corporate media ownership, putting the few independent voices remaining in the broadcast media under threat of takeover or lower-cost competition. During the last election in the country, the two largest parties successfully kept Presidential candidates of two smaller parties out of a series of televised debates, on the pretext that neither of the minor party candidates received over 15% in earlier opinion polls. (If this rule were applied in Cambodia, Sam Rainsy might not be allowed to debate.) When the election results were disputed by the candidate who received the most votes, but was not elected, the media overwhelmingly gave more positive coverage to his opponent, as post-election surveys demonstrated.

One of the major recommendations made by both NDI and IRI is the lifting of legal restrictions on re-broadcasting of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia’s Khmer language programs. This should raise questions, as both of these radio stations are US government-owned and are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be biased towards the SRP (allowing, in one view, a needed corrective to the contrary bias of Cambodian radio). It is ironic that many of those who criticize Cambodian government ownership of the broadcast media have no objections when a foreign government is involved.

How unequal media ownership affects people’s voting behavior is an unresolved question. Human Rights Watch believes the link is direct: “the government's persistent unwillingness to open up the broadcast media to opposition political parties means that only information about the incumbent CPP consistently reaches voters,” senior legal advisor James Ross said in a June 12 briefing. “If voters cannot get information about their choices at the ballot box, parties cannot meet freely and get their messages out to people, and fear is determining voters' choices, the purpose of holding an election at all is defeated.”

Indeed so, but that is a lot of if’s. Missing from Ross’s statement is any recognition of voters’ autonomy to vote their conscience, the existence of FUNCINPEC as a member of the governing coalition, and the role of local branches of each of the major parties. Granted, incumbency and control of the airwaves do give the ruling parties advantages in communicating with the electorate. (These advantages span the political spectrum and are used by incumbent parties in many countries across the globe.) Meanwhile, the opposition has assets of its own and demonstrated skill in using them—including the ability to mobilize international media and political support for its positions. These international media, in turn, are owned nearly as unequally as Cambodia’s and are biased in their own right. To the extent that media imbalances might affect election outcomes, the question is not limited to Cambodia.

The Role of International Observers

In the Asia Foundation survey, 72% of those who voted in the commune elections saw independent monitors when they voted and felt that the presence of monitors had a positive effect on voter confidence. Most of these monitors were Cambodians, not foreigners, working with groups such as COMFREL and NICFEC. Nonetheless, international observers have special roles and status as witnesses to the electoral process.

First of all, observers should be neutral. As non-Cambodians, it is not up to observers to prefer one party to another or presume to know what is best for Cambodians. Judging an election according to who wins is so obviously counter to the concept of democracy that it should not need repeating—but unfortunately Cambodia is not the only place where it does.

Second, observers should measure electoral processes according to international standards. In spite of the remark attributed to Prime Minister Hun Sen to the effect that “international standards apply only in sports,” Cambodian elections follow basic international procedures, as the National Election Commission makes clear. A June 5 NEC statement that its system “compares most favorably to systems used by electoral management bodies in a large number of democracies around the world.” In assessing whether this is so, there should be no special standard for Cambodia, either too light or too harsh. (For a neutral summary of what international election standards entail, and some interesting commentary on the 1998 Cambodian experience, see “Election Integrity” at http://www.potlatch.net/main/english/ei/ei.htm.)

Organizations with long experience in election observing often stress that election day itself is just the tip of the iceberg; much of the important information and decisions for judging the success of an election occurs in the before and after phases. This is undeniable. A single election provides only a snapshot of the democratic process. Seeing an election in perspective requires a grasp of history and comparative context: not only in the few months before the election, but over a span of years, even decades.

This task becomes more manageable if election observers narrow their focus to the election itself. Observation should not become an exercise in passing judgment on a country’s entire political culture or social environment, perhaps especially if that environment is different from one’s own. Critics lambasted observers in the 1998 Cambodian election who flew in for a few days, saw high turnouts and impressive election day organization, and pronounced the result “a miracle on the Mekong.” Equally naive, however, were those who came in for a few days, heard stories of inconsistencies and a handful of beatings, and pronounced the result “unfree and unfair.” Arrogance and snap judgments can run both ways. And given the historical circumstances of US-Cambodia relations and the present climate in Washington (might one say, “climate of fear and intimidation”?), it is the snap negative conclusions that are more to be feared.

Projected Outcomes

In both the 1998 and 2002 elections, the incumbent CPP received support nationwide, particularly in rural areas. FUNCINPEC was stronger in towns and in historical strongholds such as Kompong Cham province. SRP drew support in and around Phnom Penh and other main cities. The relative fortunes of the three parties have shifted to some extent since the last national election. In 1998, the CPP won 41%, FUNCINPEC 34%, and SRP 14%. In the February 2002 local elections, these percentages were 61%, 22%, and 17%.

While there will be approximately 15 small parties also contesting the election (compared with more than 30 in 1998), the top three parties are the only ones likely to win seats in Parliament. As in most parliamentary systems, voters cast their ballots for a party, rather than an individual candidate; seats in Parliament are allocated using a proportional formula. (In 1998, this formula was one cause of post-election wrangling; in 2003, it is clearly established in advance.) The party or coalition which controls a majority of seats in the legislature forms a government with the approval of the King.

Many observers assume that the trend of both the CPP and SRP gaining votes at the expense of FUNCINPEC may continue in the 2003 vote. In one scenario, the CPP may win enough seats in Parliament (two-thirds, according to the Constitution) to rule on its own. More likely, it will continue to need the support of one of the two other major parties to form a coalition. This raises the possibility of a CPP-SRP coalition—strange bedfellows indeed, but a prospect considered by the SRP ever since its impressive 2002 showing. In a June 9 press release that may have been largely intended for foreign consumption, the SRP stated that a new coalition “cannot and will not include the current prime minister,” but leaves open the participation of the CPP as a party.

According to this press release, the SRP believes that “we will win the July elections, unless there are severe irregularities in the election process.” A leading FUNCINPEC official, Mu Sochua, made a similar statement in the Phnom Penh Post (July 7): if there were no vote-buying and the election was truly free and fair, then FUNCINPEC would undoubtedly win. These are a disturbing claims, as most observers hold that both party’s chances of victory are remote. It is possible to read these statements as threats: if we do not win the elections, it is because we were cheated, and therefore we will object. Should the CPP win an outright majority, critics in Washington can be expected to raise a firestorm of protest, whether the outcome was arrived at fairly or not.

Cambodia does not need a repeat of the 1998 aftermath, in which the losing parties refused to accept the results and the country fell into several months of political limbo. The country hopes to enter the World Trade Organization in September, a step that could be threatened by post-election chaos. A long-awaited June agreement with the UN regarding a Khmer Rouge tribunal needs a secure atmosphere in order to proceed. And the US and other donors have signaled that if the election goes smoothly, Cambodia may become eligible for increased aid. The conditions placed in Mitch McConnell’s Senate legislation, however, send a different message: that not only the election process counts, but also its results.

After years of struggling against the demons of the past, Cambodia finally appears ready to turn the corner to becoming a more stable democracy. The signs are good that the country has made progress since the last national election—then comes depressing news of a mob burning the Thai Embassy or police firing at protesting garment workers. Cambodians deserve better, regardless of which party they choose to vote for.