Date: April 2, 2002

The recent release of 28 Thai and Lao men held in a Thai jail since a July 2000 raid on a Lao customs station has brought this mysterious episode of violence back to the spotlight. The legal and political issues surrounding the captives’ status in Thailand, and possible extradition to Laos, are complex but do not warrant US interference. People who carry out armed attacks against customs posts are, by definition, not human rights activists or legal protesters. At a time when the US is pursuing an international campaign against terrorism, these distinctions are especially crucial.

Before dawn on July 3, 2000, at least 60 heavily armed men attacked an immigration and customs post at Vang Tao, Champassak province, Laos, holding 15 hostages at gunpoint until daylight. Following a shootout, Lao border police recaptured the post, killing five of the attackers and sending the others fleeing back to Thailand, where 28—17 Lao citizens and 11 Thais—were captured by Thai police, who seized a large cache of weapons from the attackers. The others escaped.

The attack came in the midst of a series of unsolved bombings in Laos beginning in March 2000. While some of these incidents appear to be were reportedly connected to personal feuds or out-of-control business disputes, others are allegedly the work of ethnic Hmong insurgent groups, aimed at creating terror and instability in the country in advance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1975 Lao revolution. The US State Department’s 2001 Human Rights Report characterized insurgency activities as "acts of deliberate terror against citizens who do not support resistance to the Government."

Unlike the bombings, the July 2000 border raid did not target civilians. It appeared to be well-planned and coordinated. Thai TV cameras were present at the border crossing, suggesting they had been tipped off. Thai press accounts identified the raiders as members of a little-known anti-Lao government group, the Neutral Justice and Democratic Party. According to the Bangkok Post, the raiders carried a Lao royalist flag and a "two-page letter typed in Lao with the letterhead of the United Lao Nation Resistance for Democracy in Laos…sent from the office of the resistance movement in Fresno, California." However, there is no evidence of direct involvement of a US-based group in planning the attack.

Although this does not appear in media accounts of the raid, reputable sources suggest that at least one of the raiders is a US citizen. If so, this person or persons’ actions may be in violation of the Neutrality Act, which prohibits US citizens from carrying out armed attacks against a foreign country with which the United States is at peace. Laos and the US do not have an extradition treaty, so any raiders who escaped to the US are not at risk of being sent back to Laos, but they may be prosecuted under US law.

Soon after the border attack, Laos and Thailand did sign an extradition treaty, but the agreement is not retroactive. Therefore, the Lao request to extradite the raiders, which was issued immediately after the attack, was refused by Thai courts. The Thai government held the 28 captured raiders in detention until a March 2002 trial. The Thai citizens were fined and released on March 19, while the Lao were given retroactive prison terms expiring on March 31. After the trial decision was announced, the Lao ambassador to Thailand repeated his extradition request; when that was denied, he sought to bring additional charges against the group in Thailand. Thai courts are currently considering this request.

Lawyers for the detainees seek to have them classified as "refugees" and possibly brought to the US. This would be a mistake, as the US has no need to become enmeshed in what is essentially an issue between Thailand and Laos. The fact that Laos, like many of its Asian neighbors, is identified by the State Department as a country with a poor human rights record in no way condones the attack.

Laos does have a right to ask for the extradition of the raiders, and it is up to the Thai courts to accept or deny that request. The US State Department recognizes the Thai courts as independent, despite problems with corruption. Although the Lao legal system does not meet these standards, under customary international law it does have jurisdiction over an attack that occurred in Lao territory. Like other countries, the US recognizes that Laos can prosecute such cases under terms of its own laws. In the case of a US citizen arrested in any foreign country, the US can only demand that the person be treated equally to any other suspect in a criminal case. In the case of a non-US citizen, the US has no legal authority to intervene.

These statements may seem elementary, but as sympathizers and backers of the cross-border attackers seek to portray what was essentially an act of war as a human rights issue, it is worth keeping the context in mind. The US Congress and State Department should respect the jurisdiction and decision of the Thai courts and not allow the case to affect US relations with either Thailand or Laos. In addition, the FBI and other relevant agencies should cooperate with Thai and Lao authorities to determine whether any suspects currently in the United States should be questioned or arrested in this case or in connection to other related incidents of violence in Southeast Asia.