Spring 2003 Interchange           Indochina page           FRD home

Fund for Reconciliation and Development
Indochina News Spring 2003



The following articles are from the
Spring 2003 Interchange.
Articles from the Fall 2002, Spring 2002 and Summer 2002 Interchanges are still available.




Washington Report

Cambodia, UN Agree to Set up Khmer Rouge Tribunal

Vietnam Mine/UXO Report Released

Vietnam Sets NGO Priorities

Regulations and Implementation of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam

NGO Profile: Village Focus International

Cambodia & Democratization

Opportunity to Serve as Cambodian Election Observer

The Laos-Iraq-Vietnam Connection

Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam Speak on Iraq

A Laotian Leader Returns

Letters on Lao NTR






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Fall Washington Report

Commerce Makes Preliminary Ruling on Vietnamese Catfish

On January 28 the Department of Commerce announced a preliminary determination that imports of frozen catfish from Vietnam were dumped on the US market. The Department maintained that ten Vietnamese companies were dumping catfish at below margin prices at margins ranging from 37 to 61 percent. Although high, these margins were much lower than those claimed by the Catfish Farmers of America, which held that they were as high as 190 percent. The group has lobbied hard for tariffs, alleging that imports have cut the price of catfish in half in the United States over the past two years.

A final determination is expected from Commerce in June. In the interval, Vietnam is required to place funds into escrow against the tariffs retroactively imposed. If the final ruling is negative (i.e.,does not find dumping), these monies will be returned. The imposition of permanent tariffs requires a final determination from the Commerce Department that dumping has occurred, and a ruling from the US International Trade Commission that Vietnamese catfish imports have injured or threatened the corresponding US industry.

Paired with the January determination was a ruling by the Commerce Department last November, that Vietnamese economy is not yet a market economy. The Department contends that the Vietnamese government intervenes in the country’s price system, artificially forcing prices down.

The Vietnamese government strongly criticized the determination as an exercise in protectionism and insisted it is contrary to the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement.

Some Washington-based economists disagree with the Commerce view of the Vietnamese economy. They point out that prices have been progressively liberalized in Vietnam since the inception of doi moi in the mid-1980’s; moreover, the number of private companies have increased by nearly 200 percent in the past decade. Viet Vu, a United Nations economist, warned that the preliminary catfish ruling was tantamount to “attacking the private sector that the United States wants to develop in Vietnam.”
Some Congressional figures have criticized the Commerce ruling as well. In a letter to Commerce Secretary Don Evans, Senators Diane Feinstein (D-California) and John McCain (R-Arizona) voiced opposition to the determination. The success of Vietnam’s catfish exports, they maintained, is due not to illegal trade practices but to the quality of the fish and the relatively low cost of production.


Vietnam Human Rights Act Reintroduced

On April 3 Congressman Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey) re-introduced the Vietnam Human Rights Act into the House of Representatives. The bill’s predecessor passed last year in the House by a large margin (410-1) but was effectively defeated in the Senate when Senator John Kerry (D-Mass) placed a hold on it. The draft Act is expected to pass the House again, but its fate in the Senate is less promising. The bill may receive a more sympathetic hearing in that chamber than it did last year, since Senator Kerry has been replaced as the Asia Pacific Subcommittee chair by Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas), who is considered to be part of the Congressional human rights caucus. However, most analysts do not believe that Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, will support the legislation.

Among the policy measures in the 2003 version of the Vietnam Human Rights Act are (a) prohibition of Fiscal Year 2004 US nonhumanitarian assistance to Vietnam unless certain human rights conditions are met; (b) instruction that US Executive Directors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund oppose loans to Vietnam unless the President certifies that religious freedom has improved; (c) authorization of $2 million each for FY 2004 and FY 2005 to fund programs for human rights promotion through NGO’s and individuals; (d) authorization of increased Radio Free Asia broadcasts to Vietnam, in response to perceptions that existing RFA programs are being jammed; and (e) authorization of funds for refugee resettlement.


South Vietnam Flag Bill Dies in Virginia, Is Reborn in California

This winter a revealing clash played out among elements of the Vietnamese-American community, businessmen, and the US and Vietnamese governments over a proposed Virginia state bill to require the pre-1975 flag of South Vietnam, rather than the present Vietnamese flag, be flown at state functions. Sponsored by state delegate Robert D. Hull (D-Fairfax), the bill passed in the Virginia House on January 31, the 35th anniversary of the Tet offensive in the Vietnam war. Hull maintained that his legislation represented the wishes of the 29,000 Vietnamese-Americans in his district, whom he said “come from communities that were in South Vietnam.” Hull’s careful demographic description was an attempt to blur any distinction between first-generation Vietnamese-Americans and those who were born in the United States.

Reaction to the bill came quickly from several quarters. The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested the legislation, causing Secretary of State Colin Powell to assure Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien in a letter that the State Department opposed the move on the grounds that any attempt to alter recognition of the current flag was unconstitutional. The Department also conveyed this position to William J. Howell (R-Stafford), Virginia House Speaker, and to Senate Majority Leader Walter Stosch (R-Henrico). In the meantime, the Virginia Chamber of Commerce released a statement of strong opposition to the bill, expressing fear that it would deny Virginia businesses entrée to Vietnamese markets, and that Vietnamese trade could be diverted from Virginia ports to neighboring Baltimore or Charleston. US veterans groups and representatives of international non-governmental organizations with programs in Vietnam also released statements in opposition to the legislation. The NGO group warned that recognition of the South Vietnamese flag “…would focus on the past, instead of the future, where this nation of 80 million citizens - nearly half of them born after the war ended - is moving confidently ahead.”
In the Virginia Senate, the bill was rapidly sentenced to death by committee assignment. The Senate Rules Committee sent House Bill 2829 to a subcommittee with a single member, Thomas K. Norment (R-James City), who has announced that the subcommittee will not meet before the General Assembly adjourns. Hull proposed an amendment to make flying the flag of South Vietnam optional rather than mandatory, but that too was quickly turned away in the Senate.
This incident can be viewed in a continuum of efforts by some lobbies in the Vietnamese-American community which oppose the present government in Vietnam and seek to reverse the outcome of the Vietnam war. In June 2002 Virginia Governor Mark Warner (D) declared June 19 Vietnamese American Freedom Fighter Day, and cast the South Vietnamese flag as an “eternal symbol of hope and love of freedom.” A more far-reaching, if far-fetched, attempt played out in Congress in 2002 over the Vietnam Human Rights Act. The proposed bill would have required any humanitarian, educational, or business organizations working in Vietnam to submit an annual report on human rights progress in the country or lose federal support. Vietnam’s normal trade status with the US would have been predicated on human rights progress as reflected in these reports. The bill last year was blocked in the Senate by John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and John McCain (R-Arizona).

Such disputes uncover ruptures in the American political fabric and in some segments of American society. Overall, the national political level - in both Congress and the administration - supports an ongoing and forward-looking relationship with the present government of Vietnam and broader Vietnamese society. To be sure, this consensus was hard-fought in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Not surprisingly, given the grassroots nature of American politics, the local political level is less united on policy toward Vietnam, particularly where there are communities of Vietnamese-Americans. However, both the Vietnam Human Rights Act and the Virginia flag issue demonstrate that this turbulence at the local level can create national issues and ultimately affect relations between the United States and Vietnam. In addition, these episodes reveal growing political daylight within the Vietnamese-American community itself. Some analysts believe that they are attempts by older generations to assert leadership over those born in the US. Younger generation spokespersons emphasize that their parents’ experiences are reflected in their political positions, but that, in the words of one activist quoted in the Washington Post, “they should also teach us how to move on…”

These issues have resonance in more than one locality in the Vietnamese-American community. No sooner had the Virginia bill been effectively quashed when a similar resolution was passed in the city of Westminster in Orange County, California. Resolution 3750 calls for the South Vietnamese flag to be displayed at Westminster public institutions, schools attended by Vietnamese-American students, and public functions of the Vietnamese-American community. It also recommends introducing a similar resolution for consideration by the California state assembly. The Vietnam-USA Society in Hanoi has issued a strong statement saying the resolution “does harm to efforts being made by the two peoples for friendship and cooperation between our countries” and requests that American friends work for its repeal.

The Millennium Challenge Account: Will Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Be “Challenged”?

The Bush administration is seeking to reform US foreign assistance with a new program that will increase levels of core development assistance by 50% over the next three years, to reach the level of $5 billion in the third year. In its budget proposal to Congress for Fiscal Year 2004, the administration requested the establishment of a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which Bush has defined as “a new compact for global development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor nations alike.” The administration plans to administer the MCA through a new government corporation, supervised by a Board of Directors composed of Cabinet-level officials and chaired by the Secretary of State.

The criteria for recipient countries under the MCA are complicated. The first cut is per capita income. In the initial year of the program, recipient countries must have a per capita income below $1,435; the ceiling rises in subsequent years to include lower middle-income countries. However, recipient countries must also satisfy an extensive formula for performance criteria. Under the category of “governing justly,” countries will be assessed according to indices produced by Freedom House and the World Bank, on civil liberties, political rights, good governance and control of corruption. Under “investing in people,” countries must demonstrate commitment to public health and education, based on the percentage of Gross Domestic Product they devote to these sectors. Under “promoting economic freedom,” countries will be assessed according to credit ratings, inflation, budget deficits and trade policy.

Will Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos qualify for funds under the MCA? All three countries are well under the per capita income ceiling for the first year. However, their ratings under the performance criteria and the indices that undergird them could exclude them. For example, in their annual ratings on political freedom and civil liberties released in January, Freedom House graded all three countries as “not free,” the lowest rating, although Cambodia was judged to be slightly higher than Vietnam and Laos. Cambodia also is likely to get a slightly higher rating on some aspects of economic freedom. It is not known at this time whether forward momentum - moving in a positive direction - will have bearing on a country’s status. However, all foreign aid becomes politicized in short order, and the MCA is not likely to be exempted. Countries could be affected by their public image in the United States; within the policy community, they are also likely to be assessed according to their strategic importance to US policy goals. The latter will doubtless be influenced by the current war on terrorism, in which none of the three countries of Indochina are considered to be significant players.








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Cambodia, UN Agree to Set up Khmer Rouge Tribunal



Hans Corel, chief negotiator for the United Nations, and HE Sok An, Minister to the Council of Ministers, have finalized the text for the tribunal court to prosecute crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge . The Cambodian cabinet has approved of the draft agreement and it is now in the hands of the UN Third Committee for consideration before it goes to the General Assembly for a vote. The Cambodian National Assembly will vote on the agreement after it is approved by the UN General Assembly.

According to the agreement, the tribunal would look only at crimes committed between April 17, 1975 and January 6, 1979. In addition, the court would only prosecute senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia.

According to Corel, the new agreement differs from previous negotiations which were halted by the UN Secretary General in February 2002 in four key areas:

· First, the General Assembly of the United Nations has taken responsibility for the process, which is now based on its mandate.
· Second, the agreement, if approved and ratified, would be an international agreement governing the cooperation between the United Nations and Cambodia and would have to be implemented in accordance with all requirements under the law of treaties.
· Third, the cumbersome structure with three instances - Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber and Supreme Court -has been changed to a two-instance system.
· Fourth, the procedural provisions of the text of the agreement are formulated more in accordance with the proposals by the United Nations and are further enhanced in light of General Assembly resolution 57/228.

The draft agreement states that there would be one Trial Chamber with three Cambodian and two international judges and one Supreme Court Chamber with four Cambodian and three international judges. Decisions in the two Chambers would be taken by a majority of four judges and five judges, respectively.

In addition, there would be two co-investigating judges and two co-prosecutors. In both cases there would be one Cambodian and one international official. In case they differed on whether to proceed with an investigation or a prosecution, that difference would be settled by a Pre-Trial Chamber consisting of three Cambodian and two international judges where at least four judges would have to agree in order to stop an investigation or a prosecution.

The maximum penalty for conviction would be life imprisonment.

Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, as reported in an Associated Press article, said that the Cambodian side could not easily block indictments, and that a public accounting of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, no matter what verdicts are reached, would be ensured.





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Vietnam Mine/UXO Report Released
by the Hatfield Group.



Hatfield Consultants Ltd. of West Vancouver, Canada, released in January 2003 a report entitled Development of Methodologies and Technology for Supporting Clearance of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in Viet Nam. The project was carried out with the cooperation of the 10-80 Division, Ministry of Health (Ha Noi, Viet Nam) and other Vietnamese regional government agencies in the Aluoi Valley of central Viet Nam where Hatfield has, for the past 10 years, been studying the residual effects of Agent Orange used by the US military during the war. Hatfield and their Vietnamese counterparts developed and applied alternate approaches to clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in soils that were potentially contaminated by dioxin that resulted from the use of Agent Orange.

Residents of post-conflict areas of the world often continue to suffer from the impacts of war long after the guns have been silenced. Highly visible effects such as damaged or destroyed buildings, bridges, roads, etc., are fairly easy to assess and rectify. It is the economic, social and environmental impacts resulting from war that are far more difficult to quantify and mitigate. These less visible impacts are often not properly considered during post-conflict remediation. Proper planning and integration of environmental considerations at an early stage can significantly reduce the time and cost required to restore environments impacted by war.

Viet Nam remains highly contaminated with UXO and landmines, almost thirty years after the end of the US-Viet Nam War (1961-1975). Approximately eight million tons of ordnance were dropped on Indochina during the war, compared to four million tons dropped by US and UK forces in World War II in all theatres. More than half of this total was dropped on South Viet Nam, approximately one million tons on North Viet Nam, and two million tons on Lao PDR and Cambodia. In addition, approximately eight million tons of US artillery was used in South Viet Nam. It is estimated that 350,000 tons of UXO remain hidden in the country.

The Landmine Monitor Report also estimated that at least 5% of Vietnamese territory has been affected by landmines and UXO, or a total of 16,478 km2 (5,932 squares miles). Most ordnance fell in jungle and rural areas rather than cities. UXO is scattered throughout all 61 provinces and major cities. According to a nationwide survey conducted in 1999 by the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs, over 38,000 people have been killed and more than 64,000 have been injured by landmines and UXO since the end of the Viet Nam War, which is equivalent to approximately 180 casualties per month.

Despite extensive efforts since the end of the war, only a fraction of land area containing landmines and UXO has been thoroughly cleared and is considered safe for human habitation and use. To complicate the problem, demining and/or UXO clearance may be carried out in soils contaminated with war-related chemicals. Studies have shown that many of these chemicals are harmful to human health and local environments. In Viet Nam, widespread soil contamination has resulted from herbicide applications (e.g., Agent Orange contaminated with dioxin), anti-personnel agents, and residual blast munitions used during the war. Contamination is generally most severe in or near the many former US and South Vietnamese military bases and battle fields. Local farmers and minority people now inhabit many of these impacted areas; these people are often the poorest members of society who have little alternative but to reside in or near areas of UXO or chemical contamination.

The goal of the Hatfield project was to develop new methods and technologies to support mine action programs. Its approach included an integration of historical war records, satellite remote sensing data and geographical information systems (GIS) in order to compile and display key elements, including:
§ the bio-physical environment;
§ socio-economic impacts and constraints;
§ risk characterization of UXO and landmine contamination;
§ potential for chemical contamination; and
§ identifying goals for future land use and land rehabilitation.
This project demonstrates the importance of integrating environmental considerations prior to remediation of war-impacted areas.
For a copy of the report, contact the Hatfield Group directly


Hatfield Group
Hatfield Consultants Ltd. #201-1571 Bellevue Ave, West Vancouver, BC Canada V7V 1A6.
Tel: (604) 926-3261   Fax: (604) 926-5389
Email: hcl@hatfieldgroup.com Website:www.hatfieldgroup.com

10-80 Division
Ministry of Health
35 Nguyen Huy Tuong Street, Thanh Xuan District, Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Tel: 84.45.583.758   Fax: 84.45.583.759


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Vietnam Outlines New Priorities for International NGO Assistance


by Andrew Wells-Dang

On January 28, 2003, several days before Tet, the Vietnamese agencies responsible for cooperation with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) held their annual meeting to discuss INGO activities in 2002 and future directions in 2003. Several hundred representatives of NGOs working in Vietnam were present, making this probably the single largest NGO gathering held in Hanoi to date. Following the meeting, a reception for INGO representatives and members of the diplomatic community featured remarks by Vice President (Ms.) Truong My Hoa, among others.

The main event of the INGO meeting was a presentation by the new chairman of the Committee for Foreign NGO Affairs (COMINGO), H.E. Le Van Bang. As former Ambassador to the US (1995-2001), now Deputy Foreign Minister, Bang brings impeccable credentials to the position, as well as enthusiasm and openness. After his opening speech, a multifaceted discussion ensued during the question and answer session on topics relevant to INGOs’ presence and work in Vietnam. Amb. Bang’s involvement is a positive sign that the government is taking INGOs’ contributions seriously at a high level.

The structure of Vietnamese official bodies and organizations cooperating with international NGOs has not changed significantly in recent years. The Committee on Foreign NGO Affairs that is now headed by Amb. Bang was re-constituted in 2001 as the “competent authority” of the Vietnamese Government responsible for hosting INGOs in the country. The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO), under the presidency of Vu Xuan Hong, functions as a standing body for COMINGO as well as a coordinating agency for bilateral and multilateral committees. These include the Vietnam-USA Society (Hoi Viet My) and PACCOM, the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee. PACCOM, directed by Phan Trong Thai, is the primary partner for implementing cooperation with international NGOs. Its vice-director, Nguyen Van Kien, also serves as co-director of the VUFO-NGO Resource Center. The new Managing Co-Director of the Resource Center is David Payne, an Australian who worked previously as country director for Christian Children’s Fund.

In his public remarks, Amb. Bang told the audience that Vietnam’s recent economic achievements, especially poverty reduction, have been “contributed to greatly by external assistance” from INGOs. Though total funding last year was $85 million, much less than from large multilateral donors, he continued, “with the way [INGOs] spend money, you are almost equal to the other donors” in impact.

When the first INGOs came to Vietnam in the late 1980s, Amb. Bang explained, the government did not yet understand what these groups were. Given the statist assumptions present in Vietnam and the socialist bloc at the time, they thought “non-government” meant “anti-government.” Now, the ambassador said, the government knows better.
Ambassador Bang outlined four priorities for INGO work in the coming year:
(1) Poverty reduction, especially in remote, mountainous areas
(2) Education and vocational training, which now only gets 5% of total INGO funding
(3) Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance (UXOs)
(4) Assistance in Vietnam’s regional and international integration, including trade advocacy.
During the question and answer session, the ambassador also spoke at length about HIV/AIDS, so that could be interpreted as a fifth priority area.

What is remarkable about this list is how different it is from the traditional spheres of INGO activity in Vietnam. Of current project funding, 26% goes to health care, 24% to rural development, 22% to social welfare (a somewhat unclear category), 6% to environmental protection, 5% to education, and 3% to emergency relief and preparedness. All of these projects are clearly worthwhile, but most of them fall under only one of the priority areas: poverty reduction. Even then, the majority of INGO dollars go to cities or more easily accessible provinces, not the most remote. It could be pointed out that encouraging investment in mountainous regions will also require more flexibility for INGOs to open offices there and to work freely in areas such as the Central Highlands, which has not yet been forthcoming. If Amb. Bang’s presentation is any guide, however, the government is prepared to make such changes in accordance with Vietnamese law.

The newest emphases are areas #3 and #4. The idea that INGOs have a major role in clearing and remediating landmines and UXO was not universally accepted in the past. In the late 1990’s, as Vu Xuan Hong added later, there were only three organizations involved in landmines; now there are 30. And the advocacy roles played by INGOs such as Oxfam and Action Aid in recent coffee and catfish trade issues are truly an innovation. Amb. Bang’s recognition of these areas as legitimate priorities for INGO efforts opens the door to more such projects in the future.

Charles Bailey of the Ford Foundation asked further about the issue of Agent Orange: Given that this is a sensitive question in US-Vietnamese relations, how can INGOs best contribute? Amb. Bang answered that while there is no desire to damage relations with the US, INGOs can come in to conduct surveys and engage in humanitarian activities to help victims of toxic chemicals (or those who might be victims). The new Vietnam Fund for the Promotion of Peace, with former Vice President Nguyen Thi Binh as honorary chair, is a possible counterpart for such projects.

Another INGO representative then raised a question about local NGOs. If the government now understands that INGOs are not “anti-government,” he argued, doesn’t this also apply for domestic organizations? The Law on Associations, which would provide local NGOs with legal status, has undergone nearly 20 drafts, and at present it is “still under discussion,” replied Amb. Bang. In the meantime, INGOs can continue to work with mass organizations such as the Women’s Union and Youth Union, which are also social organizations that can function as local NGOs. Amb. Bang added: “In the future, we will have a way for local NGOs to work in Vietnam and avoid misunderstandings.”

Bui The Giang, the knowledgeable Communist Party delegate on the Committee for Foreign NGO Affairs, explained further: “We encourage the work of all organizations and individuals who are for the development of this country.” This includes mass organizations and “people’s organizations,” of which there are more than 200 by his count, only 20 of which are mostly government-funded. Others are “NGOs in the true sense of the word.” But these organizations need to represent a constituency, not only their leaders, he concluded.

Developing a constituency for local NGOs remains difficult, however, given their lack of legal status. A cross-ministry Civil Society Working Group, which also includes several INGOs, is currently looking for ways to make progress on the question of legal status. Both Mr. Giang and Amb. Bang suggested the possibility of holding a conference or seminar later this year to discuss these issues further.








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Regulations and Implementation of Foreign NGO Operations in Vietnam

By Andrew Wells-Dang



LIn a November 29, 2002 meeting with representatives of international NGOs in Hanoi, Mr. Phan Trong Thai, Director of PACCOM, presented an overview of regulations governing the operation of INGOs in Vietnam and some specific issues regarding INGOs’ legal status. The following is an unofficial summary of his remarks. -AWD


As far as the operation of INGOs in Vietnam is concerned, there are in fact no new regulations. The regulations and guidelines printed in the INGO Directory were promulgated in 1996 and last revised in April 2001. The revisions include Decision 64 and Directive 11, are intended as an addendum to the older regulations. INGOs are a part of “civil society” in Vietnam, as well as universities, institutes, groups and individuals coming to Vietnam for humanitarian and non-profit purposes.

There are currently 489 such groups, of which 381 have Vietnamese partners and ongoing programs and projects. In the last several years, the amount of support has increased, in particular from US NGOs in education and health care. PACCOM provides these organizations with permits for either (a) operation, (b) project office, or (c) representative office status. At present, approximately 40 INGOs have representative office permits, 65 project office permits, and the others permits for operation only.

Localities in Vietnam can receive funds from different sources: from the central government, district authorities, international organizations and INGOs, etc. It is therefore important to establish transparency. The Decree on Grassroots Democracy [Decree 29] at the commune level is one legal instrument aiming at people’s closer control on how funds are used. INGOs have to abide by these regulations and inform PACCOM in writing of any change or expansion in their objectives, field of work and geographical scope. According to Decision 64, Vietnamese partner institutions are also obliged to inform their respective competent authorities (a Government Ministry, provincial People’s Committee, or central office of a mass organization such as the Women’s Union). Regretfully, some INGOs are violating the stipulations of their permits. On four occasions, INGO permits have been withdrawn. In addition, some INGOs are changing their objectives or their geographical area of intervention without informing the competent authorities (in this case COMINGO).

PACCOM will also enforce regulations on visa obtention and extension, using a specific form provided by the immigration authorities. INGOs should submit these forms to PACCOM together with an official letter. Country directors of INGOs with representative or project office status will be able to apply for permanent resident cards and may receive tax free shopping privileges in the future.

Regarding websites, about which there have been questions: The newly issued regulations on Vietnam-based websites of international organisations (including INGOs) relate only to websites with the .vn domain name. Registration of these websites is done through the Ministry of Culture and Information. PACCOM can assist INGOs in preparing and forwarding these documents to the Ministry. One clear issue that INGOs should not be involved in is that of international adoption services. The new Decree No. 68/2002/ND-CP of the Prime Minister, dated 10 July 2002, restricts these services to adoption agencies which are legally established in the countries having signed international treaty on adoption cooperation with Vietnam.

Recently, some INGOs involved in international adoption services have been asked to leave Vietnam. INGOs are welcome to assist the local institutions which care for orphans or homeless children, but they are not allowed to provide any service of adopting Vietnamese children abroad.

Regarding donations of in-kind assistance, PACCOM can be of assistance provided that INGOs inform their local partners as well as PACCOM beforehand, so that PACCOM can assist the Vietnamese partner to do the necessary procedures with the customs authorities. Vietnam should not, however, become a dumping ground for second-hand goods.






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NGO Profile: Village Focus International



Village Focus International (VFI) is based in Portland, Oregon, and is committed to strengthening the capacity of poor and marginalized rural communities in Southeast Asia to improve the quality of their own lives. VFI has a full country program in Laos, implemented through a national staff of 20 people with over 70 years of experience, and also operates a program through local NGOs in Cambodia. In these countries, VFI is committed to engagement and creating healthy and respectful processes to work with government counterparts and the communities. In every case, VFI is committed to local management, to supporting local organizations and to participating in regional networks related to our four programs.

Community Education: Under the leadership of a Lao woman (Dr. Boualaphet Chounthavong, now completing her masters in Bangkok), VFI provides village-based non-formal education and training in health care and agriculture, as well as support for the formal education sector. Activities in the Community Education program include: Mother and Child Health Care; Building Birthing Houses; Malaria Prevention; Kitchen Gardens; School Construction; Teacher Training, and many other services. In every case, VFI places primary emphasis upon education, leadership, and participation at the village level, rather than simply providing physical services. While VFI does build schools, conduct health care trainings, dig wells, and supports other tangible activities in every village in which the organization operates, improving the quality of life for the long term can be accomplished only if local people have the skills to lead and maintain their own development initiatives. In all activities and training, VFI involves government counterparts and places a special emphasis on the participation and leadership of women in the villages.

Sustainable Agriculture: VFI works at the village-level to increase and improve the production and marketing of organically-grown vegetables through farmer training and capacity building. This program directly promotes sustainable methods of increasing nutrition and food security at the village level while reducing the reliance on forest gathering. VFI emphasizes income generation by improving post-harvest facilities, marketing skills and developing cooperatives. Activities in this program include: Organic Vegetable Production; Farmer Field Schools; Farmer Leadership Trainings; Food Processing and Preservation; and Fish Farming. These activities are based on environmentally sound practices, coordination with local officials and creation of a direct link between capacity building and increased income for farm families.

Anti-Trafficking in Women and Children: VFI’s anti-trafficking program assists in efforts to minimize and eliminate the dramatic problem of trafficking in women and children through village-level economic development, awareness raising and legal protection. In January 2002, VFI became the first NGO in Laos to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Lao government to start a project against trafficking in women and children signaling a beginning of VFI’s commitment to a problem international in scope and that affects tens of thousands of Lao people every year mostly crossing the Mekong border to Thailand. VFI became involved with the anti-trafficking movement with the support of Terre Des Hommes, a donor organization who started Asia ACT (Asia Against Child Trafficking), a Southeast Asian network of organizations to which VFI formally belongs. VFI is also working in coordination with the United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO) and with Lao organizations to address this problem. Activities include: Awareness Raising Campaign (community theater, info kits, participatory videos); Youth Center Development; Farm Based Income Generation; Repatriation Assistance; and Legal Protection.

Legal Reform & Conservation of Natural Resources: In 2001, VFI started the International Natural Resources Law Program (INRLP) to work with organizations and governments in SE Asia to draft and implement legislation and train local officials and local people. VFI has recently helped to develop legislation on sustainable forestry, protected areas, wildlife protection, and community forestry in Cambodia and Lao PDR. The natural resources of these countries are not only valuable to global biodiversity but is the source of livelihood for the majority of the population. Although new legislation is necessary in countries with emerging legal systems, it should focus on creating transparent and consultative processes at the community level. INRLP seeks to: gather legislation on management and use of natural resources in SE Asia; improve the dissemination; awareness and understanding of legislation at the local level; provide training and technical assistance to governments and organizations to improve methods of drafting legislation; and ensure the protection and enforcement of legal rights and responsibilities of local communities in natural resource management.

Contact VFI Executive Director Todd Sigaty at 510 SW 3rd St, Suite 420, Portland, OR 97204; phone/fax 503-238-4717. Email todd@villagefocus.org, website www.villagefocus.org.

In the Lao PDR contact VFI at PO Box 4697, Vientiane, (856)20-613825 and in Cambodia at (855)12-735105.





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Assessing Cambodia: Which Comparisons are Useful?

by Catharin Dalpino

As Cambodia approaches national elections in July, it also marks the tenth anniversary of the 1993 landmark election managed by the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia. This coincidence invites intense scrutiny of Cambodia’s political practices, and of its path toward democratization. Because of UNTAC’s role, international involvement in Cambodia’s political development has been unusually high, even a decade later. At times, the international community’s sense of “ownership” of that process has been palpable. As a result, analysts often compare Cambodia’s political processes to those of advanced Western democracies, usually under the rubric of “international standards.” Less often is Cambodia examined in light of political development in the Asia region, which is host to the broadest political spectrum in the world. Even less frequently is an attempt made to view Cambodia in the context of its own unique political history.

In conventional analysis, Cambodian political development is divided into institution-building tasks which parallel the constituent elements of a democracy: conducting free and fair elections; fostering a stable but unfettered political party system; developing an independent judiciary; and building an activist civil society that acts as a check on government. Undoubtedly, these are worthy goals, and an increasing number of Cambodians subscribe to them. However, they do not capture the near-term challenges and tasks that Cambodia must address to move its political development process forward. These include:

1. Recovering from a Quarter Century of Civil War and Internal Conflict

The political parties that emerged from the peace process in the early 1990’s were military rivals a few months prior. Peace settlements for civil wars often transfer the conflict from the battlefield to the polling station. In Cambodia and similar post- conflict nations, building trust between former combatants is an essential but lengthy task as party leaders exchange the rules of conflict for those of democratic contestation.

In civil war, leaders are accustomed to keeping populations under control, in order to maintain factional strength, and initially may find it difficult to view their adherents as constituents whose interests they now represent, or whose votes they must now win. Factional identity - politically, militarily and in broader society as a whole - is often more difficult to abandon than international advisers realize.

Cambodia is unique in the Asia region for the imprint of a past civil war on its political party system. This is not the case in East Timor, where Timorese parties were united politically against Indonesian rule. Given these circumstances, some political violence in Cambodia is likely unavoidable, although deplorable all the same. Analysts typically measure political violence in the lead-up to elections, counting numbers of casualties by party. Strictly on the basis of numbers, Cambodia surprisingly falls into the mid-range for election-related violence in Southeast Asia. In the 2002 commune elections, two dozen people were reported killed. This was twice the number whose deaths were linked to the Indonesian parliamentary elections of 1999, but only half the number killed in the Philippines national elections in 1998.

The sources of political violence are also seen in Cambodian society. In the political realm, tolerance for a broader public spectrum is becoming a public norm, but less progress has been noted in the personal realm. A comprehensive survey of Cambodian political attitudes, released in 2002 by The Asia Foundation, showed that two-thirds of Cambodians polled believe that all political parties should be allowed to operate. However, nearly the same percentage also said they would end a friendship with someone who supported an unpopular party. This month ADHOC, a Cambodian human rights organization, released findings that levels of both political and domestic violence were rising in the run-up to elections. Given Cambodia’s tragic past, levels of both political and personal violence are among the several measures of the country’s emergence from civil war.
2. Moving from Political Consensus to Political Change

Democracy is an adversarial as well as a consensual process. In the face of the pitched political contests the democracies produce, stability depends upon all parties subscribing to common rules of the game, and to the concept of a loyal opposition. These concepts must be embedded in the political culture as well as in the political system and typically can take a generation or more to develop. In post-conflict societies emerging from violent internal division, it can be difficult (and even dangerous) to move directly from military confrontation to political confrontation. In Cambodia, an interim period of consensus-building has been required. This has been seen in coalition rule and, in some government agencies, quotas and other arrangements designed to ensure factional representation. These mechanisms show, on the one hand, a willingness to move beyond a single source of power and, on the other, a reluctance for a degree of power-sharing that permits power to alternate between parties.

Coalition government has been seen at various intervals in several other Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand and Indonesia. It is often the result of a political party system organized around individual personalities rather than ideologies or platforms. It is also more typical of parliamentary systems than presidential ones, since the former often have more complicated formulas for electoral victories.

The drive for consensus is also seen in bureaucratic arrangements which reflect factional divisions. In the first post-UNTAC government in Cambodia, the major ministries were headed by a minister and a vice minister from opposite parties, except Defense and Interior which had co-ministers. The post-1998 government coalition has divided the portfolio of ministries, as is the case in several other coalition governments, though the Ministries of Defense and Interior are still led by co-ministries.

In many Southeast Asian countries, one house in the legislature typically reserves seats for appointed members, which may be distributed according to party strength or be given to segments of society which have traditionally held power. In Thailand, the appointed Senate remained for fifteen years after the democratization process began, primarily to give the military a voice in politics. It became an elected body only in the year 2000, In Indonesia, some seats are still reserved for the military. The future of the Cambodian Senate is presently under debate. It is scheduled to move to elected membership in future polls. Given the likely cost of that, however, some leaders advocate disbanding it altogether, arguing that many systems can function well enough with a unicameral legislature.

3. Forging a National Definition of Democracy

Democratization changes societies as much as it alters the formal political system. Cambodian history has little tradition of public franchise, and a record of the violent transfer of political power for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Public education - and public consensus - on the nature and definition of democracy is an important but unheralded task in the early stage of democratization. The Asia Foundation survey found that only 3% of Cambodians associate democracy with elections. Freedoms of expression and association, neither of which were present in Cambodia a quarter century ago, were seen as more essential to the development of democracy at this time.

Definitions of democracy are most likely to differ between urban and rural populations. In most Southeast Asian countries which have undergone democratization processes, democracy has gained favor first in the urban areas, among the upper and middle income, educated classes. In rural areas, where political and economic feudalism may linger (Philippines) or where military influence is greater (Thailand well into the 1980’s), democracy may mean rise in income and improvement in quality of life.

4. Setting the Pace and Sequence for Political Change

The incremental approach, in which personal rights are secured first, and was uncovered in The Asia Foundation survey in Cambodia is seen in the political development of several Asian countries. In Thailand in the 1980’s, personal rights preceded multi-party politics. As rights expanded, so did citizens’ definition of, and demand for, democracy. In recent years, Vietnam and China, have seen an enlargement in personal rights, measured against those of three or four decades ago.

Many Western policymakers and analysts are resistant to the idea of a sequence in political development, and an incremental pace. In the post-cold war era, the democracy promotion plans of many donors have implicitly urged (and expected) simultaneous progress in all aspects of political development. These expectations are even greater for Cambodia, because its democratization process began with an international agreement and a brief period of international custodianship.

However, the experience of other international interventions (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo) indicates that a high degree of international involvement does not necessarily guarantee a rapid democratization process. In countries where democratization has appeared to be swift, where democratic “revolutions” have occurred, some sectors of political development have lagged nevertheless. After the “People’s Power” revolution in the Philippines in 1986, military factions attempted coups against the government six times before civil-military relations achieved democratic stability. After the 1998 transition in Indonesia, commonly termed a democratic revolution, the parliament catapulted to new powers, but the judiciary remains significantly weaker.

Cambodia’s institutional development is similar to that of several of its neighbors. A relatively strong executive is a constant across Asia, even in democracies. However, as in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and even China, the Cambodian legislature is gradually becoming more assertive. And, in common with many of its neighbors, the Cambodian judiciary is considerably weaker in comparison to the other two branches.

If Cambodia is ahead of the regional curve, it is in development of its civil society. The Cambodian NGO community includes groups concerned with the traditional delivery of social services, but it is distinguished by the relatively high number of advocacy organizations: for human rights, clean elections, and other issues crucial to democratization. As well, an active press has developed in Cambodia. Although both sectors have occasionally been subject to government domination, they have proved to be determined and resilient. The Cambodian press and non-governmental sectors compare favorably to their counterparts in the semi-democratic states of Asia (Singapore, Malaysia); in the remaining authoritarian states, they have no parallel at all.

5. Indigenizing the Democratization Process

If there is a single indicator to predict the success of Cambodia’s democratization process, it is whether the country will choose, and be able, to assume full financial and administrative responsibility from the international community for that process. In a more narrow sense, this translates into whether Cambodia will continue regular elections at the national and local level, and whether it will be able to afford them. Many Cambodians believe that international funding pledged for the 2003 polls, which would cover a portion of the cost, could be the last foreign support for a Cambodian election.

The Cambodian Development Resource Center points out that, for democratization to continue, the government will have to find and allocate sufficient resources to fund at least three elections -the Senate election, the 2007 commune elections, and the 2008 national elections - beyond this year’s polls. To be sure, the cost of elections has gone down: the 1998 election total was $28 million, while the 2002 commune elections cost $18 million. However, even further reductions will present the Cambodian people with a relatively high price tag for its democratization process. In a country struggling to meet basic needs, raise income levels, and achieve greater financial self-sufficiency, the continuation of the democratization process will be a matter not only of political will, but also of knowing sacrifice.








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Opportunity to Serve as Cambodian Election Observer



The Fund for Reconciliation and Development is organizing a team of volunteer international observers for the Cambodian national election on July 27, 2003, similar to the team FRD coordinated to observe the 1998 election. To date we have more than thirty people interested in joining the observer team however there are still positions available.

For the third time since the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 Cambodia will hold a national election to democratically determine its government. International observers have contributed to the generally peaceful conduct of each election by adding their disinterested highly visible presence to the far larger number of observers mobilized by Cambodian NGOs and political parties.

Observers will be responsible for all of their costs including international airfare, internal transportation, hotels, and meals. However, FRD is continuing to search for funding to subsidize the in-country travel and housing costs. FRD will assist observers in finding affordable accommodations in Phnom Penh and at the observation locations, make in-country travel arrangements, and arrange for transportation between polling stations.

Observers need to report to Phnom Penh by July 22nd for election monitoring orientation and training. We plan on placing at least one team of observers in each province and major cities. Observers will need to remain at the observation locations through the counting process which may take up to two to three days after the elections. The observer group will meet back in Phnom Penh July 29th or 30th to share their observations and draft the group’s observation report that will be submitted to Cambodia’s National Election Commission.

If you are interested in being a self-funded volunteer observer or in supporting this effort, please contact Susan Hammond at FRD by postal mail or by e-mail at shammond@ffrd.org or call 212-760-9903 before May 1, 2003. Susan will need the following information: name, current address, phone, email, current occupation, experience in Cambodia and/or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, election experience, dates available, passport data. In addition, please specify if there is a particular province you are interested in observing.






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The Laos-Iraq-Vietnam Connection

A letter from Lee Thorn leethorn@sprintmail.com

I was involved in the bombing in Laos. Bounthanh and her whole village - those villagers that survived - were forced out of their ancestral homes by American bombing. All the villages in her home province, Xien Khuang, sometimes called the Plain of Jars, were destroyed by American bombing. The villages to which we are bringing Information Technology (IT) connectivity were ALL founded by internal refugees made homeless by American bombing 25 years ago. In some ways, villagers’ suffering continues 28 years after the end of that war.

Now, the American and British governments are undertaking another war. This one in Iraq. This one, the American government says, will start with the most intensive bombing (3000 sorties in one day) the world has ever known.

Bounthanh knows about intensive bombing. She went to school under her house at night, in a hole, by candlelight, to avoid the bombing. All the farmers in her village did their work with leaves on their backs and ducked into the paddy whenever they heard the sound of planes. Their objectives were to stay alive and to maintain their way of life. For them it was not about politics whatsoever -- at least, not at that time. Her village spent six years in refugee camps before they settled in Phon Kham. They built Phon Kham out of the jungle. They hand-dug all the canals in the rice fields. They hand-built all their houses, foraged for food, and survived. Most of them. As Bounthanh s mother told me one day as she, Vorasone and I gazed over her perfect garden, her family survived all the bombing intact. But they all did not survive the first year in Phon Kham. Two of Bounthanh’s sisters died that year, one from malaria and one from cholera.

I also know about intensive bombing. For years I had nightmares about one particular night in June 1966 when, under an order from the White House, all available planes from Guam to Japan to Thailand to South Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin were used to bomb the city of Hai Phong. That bombing started fire storms. The air caught fire. I showed the movies of this three times to the pilots of VA-55 and VAW-11. I loaded bombs for this run. I am sure thousands of people, perhaps tens of thousands, were killed that night. The vast, vast majority were civilians. The scene was horrific, vast waves of fire sweeping across that city. It sticks in my memory like a cancer.

The vast, vast majority of war dead in Iraq will be civilians: civilians that our military people will kill. Many of our soldiers and sailors and marines - and certainly many Iraqi people - will never forget this slaughter, will be haunted by these murders for decades as am I. In war everyone loses.

Just writing these words shakes me emotionally. I know almost the whole world, certainly the vast majority of the developing world and poor people everywhere, know what I am talking about. Fortunately most Americans do not. Almost all the civilian planners of this war do not. If they did, they might take their decisions with more gravity. They want to trade civilian lives for ... something ... oil, glory, ego, a new world order ... I don’t know. I can’t get inside their heads. But I’m home in my body and I’ve been traumatized by war and we need to do something else, I know ... and changing America’s mind is worth serious effort.

We are doing the opposite of war at Jhai Foundation. We come to Phon Kham and other villages as whole people which means as wounded people and flawed people, and we meet other whole people there. We get to know one another, little by little. We do this, partly, by working side-by-side. We tell our stories. We get past our denial about our past, one small step at a time. We mourn as we can. We continue to work on our friendship. And in that process we are installing things like computers and wi-fi and phone connectivity together. And this friendship building is working. We ll be back to Phon Kham fairly soon to complete the IT job ... because the villagers and all of us try to act honorably with one another.

But as a whole human being I am also a veteran of war. As such I joined with other veterans supporting a veterans march on Washington, what we call Operation: Dire Distress . www.vaiw.org/vet

Yours in Peace,
Lee Thorn
USS Ranger (CVA-61), Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam, 1966
Chair, Jhai Foundation (for identification)


Jhai Foundation emphasizes reconciliation.by facilitating the development of self-help projects. Jhai’s focus projects on improving the well-being of poor children are concentrated in Vientiane Province, Laos, and the Boulaven Plain in Champassak Province, Laos. During the next year we are working on a US campaign to remove unexploded ordnance in Laos, a continuous flow of hospital supplies, establishment of computer labs in schools and the installation of the unique Jhai PC and communication system in remote villages, weaving and coffee initiatives, and integrated rural development.

Jhai Foundation, www.jhai.org
921 France Ave., San Francisco, CA 94112
(415) 334 2100 (fax/voice)






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Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam Speak on Iraq



Comparisons between the current conflict in Iraq and the Vietnam war are difficult to avoid, no less for representatives of nations affected by that conflict. At the request of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Security Council held a special session about Iraq on March 26. The following statements from the Vietnamese and Lao ambassodors are from that meeting. The Cambodian Ambassador was in Phnom Pehn so his words on Iraq from last October are included here.

H.E. Mr. Ouch Borith, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of The Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations at the Open Meeting of the Security Council on the Item “the Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait” New York, October 17, 2002

The situation in Iraq has been an issue that has been the subject of discussion in this august body for more twelve years now. Nine resolutions have been adopted, which not only called for Iraq to allow inspection and the destruction of weapons of mass destructions, but also on the return of Kuwaiti and their country prisoners of war and the return of Kuwaiti property. We should therefore not lose sight of the fact that adequate machinery already exists within the United Nations system to deal with this issue. We believe that peaceful efforts in the framework of United Nations mechanism should be fully utilized and if necessary, to be strengthened.  We therefore agree with the majority of member states that all avenues must be exhausted and that the use of force should only be utilized as a means of last resort . War will have disastrous consequences and create a humanitarian disaster of enormous proportions.

We therefore strongly urge that Iraq comply with all Security Council resolutions unconditionally and in an unfettered manner. We are pleased to note that Iraq has responded to the calls of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of many member states among others by its positive attitude in the discussions with UNMOVIC and IAEA in Vienna and by sending letters to the Secretary-General declaring its acceptance of the return of the weapon inspectors to Iraq unconditionally. We trust now that the speedy return of the inspectors is imperative as a means to alleviate international tensions in this grave and dangerous situation.  Compliance by Iraq of all UN resolutions should allow the sanctions imposed on Iraq for the past twelve years which have caused innumerable sufferings for its innocent civilian population be lifted as soon as possible. 

H.E. Mr. Nguyen Thanh Chau, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the United Nations at the UN Security Council on the Question of Iraq New York, 26 March 2003

My delegation wishes to express our high appreciation to you for the quick response to convene this open debate at the request of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

So Murphy’s law has applied in this particular case. What the whole international community is breathlessly wary of has happened. The war against Iraq entered its 7th day. It is deeply deplorable that the worldwide protests and tireless efforts by many UN members at this Chamber, and by members of the Security Council had failed to materialize a solution which may have helped to avoid the tragedy. It is sad to learn of human casualties and destruction under the wings of war. The Vietnamese has an old saying “tears always run down” to describe the pains and the agony of those parents weeping for the lost children. We therefore fully understand the agony and pains of those parents on both sides of the war who lost their sons and daughters, their nightmares that last as long as the war goes on. It is even sadder to look at those wounded Iraqi children lying in hospitals in real shock and awe who would never expect to end up there after so much of sufferings in the 12 year-long sanction. Why they, of all people, always become victims to the mistakes of the grown-ups?

The use of force against an independent, sovereign state and member of the United Nations constitutes a gross violation of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law. It also renders the United Nations ineffective, creates an extremely dangerous precedent in international relations, and undermines peace and stability in the region and the world. We are of the view that this unilateral and preventive military actions against Iraq won’t help to resolve the world’s complexity and ensure its security, but it further runs the risk of wide-spreading misunderstanding, radicalization and spiraling violence in the Middle-East. The outbreak of sheer force of arms in this already volatile region can only exacerbate the tensions and fractures in which terrorism feeds. Vietnam s position on the war against Iraq is crystal clear, as has been reiterated in the statement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on March 20th, 2003.

War is a death sentence to peace. We share our voice with others, calling for an immediate end to the military actions against Iraq. This fait accompli demands for swift response by the international community in the field of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. As the supplies of essential food which 60% of the Iraqi population depends on are reported to be running low, the Oil-for-Food Program should be resumed. It is imperative for the United Nations to shoulder the responsibilities of coordinating the international efforts to help the Iraqi people to overcome the dire consequences of war and rebuild their country. The people and Government of Vietnam are ready to take an active part in this collective endeavour.


H.E. Mr. Alounkeo Kittikhoun, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Lao PDR to the United Nations at the UN Security Council on the Question of Iraq New York, 26 March 2003

My country, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), is following the question of Iraq very closely. Like the overwhelming majority of states and peoples throughout the world, we have always advocated a peaceful solution to this delicate and complex issue. Indeed, we share the deep conviction of all those who have cautioned against the unpredictable and devastating consequences of the use of force to settle this conflict, such as its enormous material damage, a large loss of human life, and a negative impact on peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world.

In spite of the opposition of the majority of the world community, on the 20th of March 2003, a large-scale military attack was launched against the Republic of Iraq - an independent and sovereign country, a member of the NAM and the United Nations. We deeply regret that the peaceful path, which was still available, was instead abandoned and that the military option was unfortunately chosen. This act of unjustified aggression, one which is not mandated by the Security Council, is a serious violation of the UN Charter and international law. The government of the Lao PDR, in its statement issued on the 20th of March 2003, appealed for an immediate end to such an armed attack in order to spare the lives of the innocent Iraqi civilian populations. We still firmly believe that a peaceful solution to this conflict, however complex, can still be attained within the framework of the United Nations. Let us give diplomacy a chance rather than continue to hear the clash of weapons. In accordance with the latest information from the mass media, the number of innocent civilian victims continues to grow. No less serious, if the war goes on, we can expect a major humanitarian crisis whose consequences would be catastrophic.

Before the outbreak of military conflict, some spoke of a quick war. Many now are talking about the possibility of a lengthy war and one that is no doubt wrought with heavy consequences. Faced with this situation, we can only feel the greatest concern and even anxiety. The international community is therefore called upon to take urgent action in order to immediately put an end to this war, which has already caused almost a thousand lives. If the world succeeds in this noble endeavor, we will have paid great service to the Iraqi people whose unbearable suffering should not be disregarded by anyone.

After the end of the bipolar era, many people had expressed the hope that they would be able to build a better world. Since that time, governments and peoples throughout the world have done everything possible and have spared no effort to promote cooperation in all possible areas amongst states. This cooperation has already recorded important achievements in many fields. In our modern history, is this not a trend that deserved to be strongly sustained? Cooperation yields benefits. All countries and peoples the world over can only rejoice over this. On the other hand, war or the use of force to settle conflict only brings destruction, misery, death, resentment, anger, and hatred.

Together we should do our utmost and continue in our effort so that dialogue and cooperation amongst states might prevail in international relations, thereby helping to preserve world peace and security. These are the thoughts, which my delegation wishes to impart to this august Council.







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A Laotian Leader Returns



An important factor in the dispute over NTR for Laos is sentiment within the Laotian-American community. In recent months, several prominent Laotian-Americans have made ground-breaking efforts to bridge gaps created by Cold War divisions. In late November Dr. Yang Dao, a Hmong-American scholar and educator of Southeast Asian history, visited Laos for two weeks to assess current conditions in contrast to the country he had left in 1975. Yang is the first Hmong to receive a Ph.D., which he earned from the Sorbonne in 1972. He served in the Ministry of Planning of the Royal Lao Government from 1972-74 and in the Political Consultative Council, a National Coalition of the Kingdom of Laos from 1974-75. Immigrating first to France, Yang moved to the US in 1983, where he has published extensively on Hmong history and culture and has taught at the university level.

In a letter detailing his visit to Laos, which Yang posted on the internet, he commented that the Hmong situation in Laos “has improved in all aspects.” He pointed out that while they constitute only 9% of the population, they hold 16% of the central and regional administrative positions. Although noting that “a few small pockets” of Hmong resistance remain, he found relations among the Hmong, Lao, Khmu and other ethnic groups to be peaceful and amicable. However, he also remarked upon the continuing poverty and lack of development in Laos and its need for international assistance. Yang’s letter strongly encouraged members of the Hmong and Lao communities in the US to visit Laos and view for themselves the social, economic and political changes that have taken place in the past three decades, and to participate in the country’s development.

Reaction to Yang’s visit from some quarters of the Lao-American community has been predictably harsh. In response, he issued a statement on January 23, pointing out that he is “not the only visitor to notice the change in Laos.” He noted that he took a strong and public stand in condemnation of attacks against the Hmong in the late 1970’s, and that he encouraged government authorities to seek a peaceful solution to residual Hmong resistance during his 2002 trip. Yang plans to make a video of his trip to Laos available to the Laotian-American community free of charge.





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Letters on Lao NTR



Following are two examples of letters arguing for NTR for Laos. The letter to Ambassador Zoellick was signed by 60 heads of NGOs and individuals including Lao-Americans. The letter to Chairman Crane is more extensive than we could print here. The texts of both letters with full lists of signatures are at www.ffrd.org/indochina/laos.

January 14, 2003
The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick
United States Trade Representative
209A Winder Building
600 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Zoellick,

We, the undersigned Laotian-Americans, representatives of non-governmental organizations and business associations, and concerned individuals thank you for your support of the U.S.-Laos Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). We urge you to submit the BTA to the 108th Congress as soon as it convenes for prompt consideration and passage. We represent a diverse group of backgrounds and interests, but we are all united in our conviction that the United States and Laos will benefit greatly from the normal trade relations (NTR) that will follow Congressional passage.

As you know, Laos is one of only seven countries under non-NTR or embargo-type policies in U.S. foreign policy. The denial of NTR to Laos in light of normal trade relations granted to Vietnam and Cambodia makes little sense. The United States and Laos signed the BTA in 1997, and its ratification forms part of President Bush’s trade agenda. President Bush recently cited Laos as one of the countries included in the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, with the aim of helping that country, Cambodia and Vietnam integrate into the international economy. Moreover, bilateral efforts to address POW/MIA issues and stem the flow of narcotics continue to be productive.

We are mindful that trade agreements negotiated by the Executive Branch and approved by Congress are only the first stage of stronger and more mutually beneficial ties. It is incumbent upon the government of Laos to provide American companies and their own state and private enterprises with the legal framework and operational authority they need to pursue successful trade and investments.

After 1975, the United States and Laos maintained official ties when relations with Vietnam and Cambodia had been completely severed. It is time to remove discriminatory tariff barriers and to take this last major step toward the normalization of relations. We look forward to working with you to achieve this. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely,


Sixty individuals and representatives of non-governmental organizations in support of trade with Laos
April 1, 2003
The Honorable Philip M. Crane
Chairman
Subcommittee on Trade
Committee on Ways and Means
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Crane:

On behalf of the US-ASEAN Business Council and its 150 member companies doing business in the ASEAN countries, I am writing to express our support for the extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos. The Council has been on record in support of NTR for Laos since the negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement between the United States and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 1997. We agree with the Committee Advisory’s March 5 statement soliciting comments that ratification of the agreement “will represent an important step toward economic reform and openness, key U.S. priorities in Laos.”

...the importance of the ASEAN region to American political, economic and security interests is increasing and there is a lot that needs to be done to increase our engagement of ASEAN and its member nations. In our most recent paper of February, 2003 we specifically listed the establishment of [NTR] with Laos as an achievable accomplishment for 2003.

Furthermore, the Administration itself is fully supportive of NTR for Laos... Granting NTR to Laos would also be a step forward to achieving the laudable goals set out by President George Bush during the October 2002 APEC meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico... Lao is one of the poorest countries in the world, but thanks to its lack of normal trade relations with the US is subject to the highest average tariffs. According to an analysis by Ed Gresser of Progressive Policy Institute, Laos faces the highest average tariffs in the world (45.3%), higher even than North Korea’s (35%) and Yugoslavia’s (27.7%)...

We commend you and the Committee for considering taking this long overdue step to normalize economic relations between the United States and Laos. We look forward to working with you to achieve this. Thank you for your consideration.


Sincerely yours,

Ernest Z. Bower
President
US-ASEAN Business Council






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