“government of a friendly country” between the Lao Communist Party and Lao abroad. For such a goal, terrorist bombings and cross border attacks can be a method to rally supporters, raise funds and attract the attention of potential mediators without posing any real threat to the existing government.
Barbara Crossette interviewed the two princes for the New York Times during the summer. Her article acknowledged that French colonialism, “promoted the modern Laotian monarchy. As its heir, the prince is portrayed in Laos as a client of the West.” However, she also accepted their view that the bombings and Hmong rebellion had, “shaken the last largely unreconstructed Communist government of Southeast Asia.”
The fact that an attack was staged from Thailand undermines the theory of internal Lao Communist Party conflict reflecting a Vietnam-China rivalry. But why would Thailand cooperate in such a potentially regionally destabilizing adventure? The Lao appear to accept on good faith statements from Thailand’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister that they completely oppose use of their territory to interfere with a neighbor—and point out that two bombs coincided with the visits of high level Thai delegations.
However, as had previously been the case in Cambodia, it is entirely possible that factions within the Thai military are carrying out their own agenda. This could be based on historic Thai claims on contested border areas, strategic discomfort with close cooperation between Laos and Vietnam on political and military matters, or festering resentment with the embarrassing Lao success during the border war of 1984-86.
The US Dimension
Also of interest is the possible American connection. It does not help, but also does not mean much, that the State Department’s Lao Desk Officer met the princes at their request. Under the Clinton Administration there is no likelihood of official US involvement with overseas Lao militants. The same may not be true of past or future Republican Administrations.
Among Lao Americans, the majority has in effect made peace with the past. However, there is a die-hard leadership core that proclaims its undying devotion to reversing their 1975 defeat. Both ethnic Lao and ethnic Hmong have established links with anticommunist conservatives in the Congress, as well as with some liberals who have Lao constituents or see foreign policy largely through an ideological prism of western style human rights and democracy.
Because there is not much current or prospective US investment in Laos, the country’s population is small, and its landlocked location seemingly lacks strategic value, there is little counter-pressure to balance opponents in Washington. Although Laos and the US signed a trade agreement more than two years ago, the Administration has not submitted it to the Congress because of fear that the atmosphere on the Hill is not conducive to passage.
Allies of the princes are active in Washington. A Washington think tank called the Center for Public Policy Analysis has organized five closed briefings in the Capitol under the rubric of the “U.S. Congressional Forum on Laos”. According to organizers, the “series seeks to explore and develop a deeper awareness of the current situation in Laos and the challenges and opportunities surrounding the 25th anniversary of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR)… Seating is exclusive. The event is by invitation only.” Among their speakers has been Vang Pao.
Unfortunately muted to date is the voice of American NGOs whose experience provides a more balanced perspective on Laos and on its process of economic, social and governmental renovation. We should be finding allies in the Congress to support the trade agreement and then urging the State Department to move forward. We should also be asking the State and Justice Departments whether under the Neutrality Act or other applicable laws they are investigating any possible involvement of Lao Americans in terrorist bombings, the Hmong insurgency or the attack from Thailand.
We should also oppose any exception being made for Hmong who cannot pass normal citizenship requirements for literacy and knowledge of US institutions. Hmong demonstrators have demanded this in Washington, claiming they received war time guarantees of citizenship from US officials. However, even some people in Congress sympathetic to fulfilling alleged CIA or military promises, were put off by Hmong demands that their own organization should determine who was eligible for accelerated citizenship.
It will not help US-Lao relations if Hmong who could not adapt here show up inside Laos with US citizenship. In addition to the two disappearances mentioned above, in January the Thai arrested on a charge of carrying concealed weapons three Lao American citizens and three permanent residents who failed in an effort to illegally cross the Mekong. The passport of a seventh Hmong American from Minneapolis, Charlie Vang, was also found by Thai officials. Vang is presumed to have been wounded and fallen out of his boat. The six jailed men were released without explanation after one month.
It plays into the hands of those wishing to destabilize Laos to overemphasize the significance of these incidents. So far no one has been killed by bombs but there have been serious injuries. At a time of economic hardship, much needed revenues and employment from tourism have been lost. Since no one has credibly taken responsibility for the bombs or been arrested, needless anxieties have been created among Lao civilians and international NGOs working in the country.
While there is no reason to believe that either the Thai or US governments are in any way complicit with these sad events, it is also not clear how much either is doing to prevent their repetition.
—John McAuliff usindo@igc.org