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From Bombs to a Border Raid

Then between March 30 and September 10 there were six bomb and grenade explosions in Vientiane as well as several other failed attempts and faxed threats. Motives are cloudy because no one has claimed “credit”. At least some of the early incidents appear to have been private or business affairs, which may have inspired “copy-cat” terrorism for political purposes.

The choice of targets suggests one goal was to undermine the government’s successful campaign to substantially increase tourism. Another likely motive is in response to the symbolism of December 2d, the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Lao PDR. The run-up to that date is a rallying cry and fund raising vehicle among overseas Lao militants, just as April 30th was for their Vietnamese counterparts. Whether sincerely, in their own terms, or opportunistically, heated rhetoric can escalate into action, no matter how quixotic.

Lao authorities downplay the significance of the bombs, noting that such things are not uncommon in other Southeast Asian countries. Thai and international publications based in the region, most notably the Far Eastern Economic Review, have exaggerated their significance. Whether due to sheer speculation and rumor mongering or to an organized campaign of disinformation, stories have sought to convey an aura of national instability and to shift the blame to conflict within the Lao Communist Party based on generation, region and pro-Chinese vs. pro-Vietnamese factional divisions.

News reports have also appeared quoting conveniently anonymous diplomatic sources to the effect that Vietnamese military forces have been sent to Laos to battle Hmong insurgents, and even that truckloads of Vietnamese soldiers were seen on the streets of Vientiane. (Had they taken a wrong turn on their way to Xieng Khoang?) Two bomb targets were Vietnamese-linked locations in Vientiane, although there is little anti-Vietnamese ethnic tension in Laos compared to Cambodia.

The international press has paid little attention to the issue of possible Thai complicity, but Thai-Lao relations are being affected by the situation. Lao authorities suspect that Hmong refugees still in Thailand or already repatriated to Laos are a conduit of funds, supplies and occasionally personnel to the relatively small highlands insurgency.

Thailand’s role has come under greater suspicion because of a bizarre raid on a customs and immigration post in southernmost Laos on July 3d. Some 30 to 60 heavily armed men in camouflage uniforms somehow managed to cross over the border from Thailand at Chong Mek/Vang Tao. Thailand’s ITV television network had been alerted in advance to insure the event would be reported. After an armed confrontation in which six raiders were killed, survivors fled back to Thailand and 28 were arrested: 14 Lao nationals, 10 Thai nationals and 4 of undetermined nationalities

To date the Thai government has refused Lao requests to extradite the attackers, insisting their fate must be determined by the process of Thai courts. The Lao complain that Thailand also has not returned $150,000 worth of goods stolen from the Lao duty free shop. Thai media broadcast that 3,000 Lao students had gathered on that day to demonstrate at the border. Since there was no demonstration of any kind, one wonders whether this is a case of wishful thinking, propaganda or disinformation.

Lao officials describe the attackers as “bandits” with robbery as their motive. That may be either a political or a legal characterization, seeking to preclude claims for political asylum. In any case, it is clear from documents released at the time and from the flying of the flag of the pre-1975 Royal government that at least some among the attackers had a political agenda. Martin Stuart-Fox, a professor of history at the University of Queensland told the New York Times, “it’s the old network of resistance that was being supported by the Thai military and by an expatriate Lao network in the United States and France and Australia and is trying to resuscitate itself.” (7/20/00)

Royal Pretenders

Raiders called for the restoration of a constitutional monarchy. Within twenty-four hours of the attack, “Prince” Sauryavong Savang, the exile regent of the unrecognized Royal family, had responded favorably to their aspiration on Radio France International. Sauryavong never claimed reponsibility or prior knowledge, and two days later backed away from implicit public endorsement, but the Thai army, based on captured documents, accused him of backing the attack.

At the time Sauyavong made his statement, he and the purported “crown prince”, 36 year old Soulivong Savang, were on a speaking tour of the US. This was the second or third such national tour since February involving appearances on college campuses, at World Affairs Councils, and in late June at the Army-Navy Club in Washington. Their one-sided portrayal of Laos generally is unchallenged by audiences with scant independent information.

Sauyavong created the “Council of Lao Overseas Representatives” in 1997 in Seattle to oppose the government. He and Soulivong claim credit for encouraging anti-Lao PDR resolutions in the Senate and House in 1998 and 1999. Soulivong told an audience at Dartmouth College on February 21st that overseas Lao “conscious of the fact that their disorganized struggle [for democracy] has not been able to reach its objective, …have turned to the Lao Royal Family to unify all the Lao people.”

While denying they support an armed struggle, the former royals insisted at Dartmouth that the Lao Communist Party will never allow a multiparty system. Their solution, is mediation by the