The Hidden Legacies of War

Twenty-five years after troops from the north and from the National Liberation Front marched into Saigon and reunified the country, the effects of war persist under the surface—in some cases quite literally, in the form of soil contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and Agent Orange. In other cases, the effects are more subtle, stemming from unequal economic and power relationships. Normalization of relations and the trade agreement have had little direct effect on these issues, as the US has never accepted responsibility for the war and the devastation it caused. Humanitarian and economic assistance have been shamefully inadequate. In the immediate post-war period, the Vietnamese government insisted on aid for “healing the wounds of war” as a condition for normalizing relations with the American aggressors. The text of the Paris Peace Agreement called for such assistance, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had made a verbal promise during negotiations to contribute to reconstruction after peace was achieved.

This Vietnamese position possessed a clear moral legitimacy. As no funds appeared, however, it became clear to the Vietnamese negotiators that the US had no real intention of ever paying for the damage it had inflicted. US policy has consistently viewed improved relations, trade agreements and the like as a gift, visible proof of America’s generosity. And yet the gift is not free, but carries numerous conditions attached: improved market access for American goods, so-called “intellectual property rights,” better treatment of refugees, freedom to search for remains of Americans missing in action, improvements in human rights and religious freedom. All of these are doubtless good things for Vietnam to consider, but to have them imposed as conditions rankles, given the historical background.

Since 1990, the State Department has provided limited funding to nonprofit organizations in Vietnam through USAID’s War Victims Fund and Displaced Children and Orphans Fund. This approximately $10 million in total grants should be applauded, but despite what many NGOs have achieved in Vietnam, USAID’s efforts have still been pitifully small relative to the scope of Vietnam’s postwar problems. The figure pales in comparison to the $146 million in wartime debts contracted by the former South Vietnam, now being repaid to the US under a 1997 debt agreement. As US-Vietnam relations improve and Vietnamese policies towards NGOs become more open and transparent, the US should remove existing restrictions on foreign assistance to Vietnam and expand its existing programs, particularly in areas where the US bears a direct responsibility for the legacies of war.

In a small but significant step forward, a delegation from the State Department’s Humanitarian Demining Office visited Vietnam in June and agreed to provide $1.7 million in mine clearance equipment and technical support. Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s landmark visit to Hanoi in March also has contributed to shifting US policy in more constructive directions. While not making any specific proposals or accepting US responsibility, Cohen did agree to discuss, for the first time, cooperation on landmines and Agent Orange. Progress in these related, yet distinct, areas is essential to a new reconciliation agenda.

The Ongoing Scourge of Landmines and UXO

Vietnam remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, though it has received comparatively little attention in the international landmine campaign. The Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) reported in September 1999 that 38,248 people have been killed and 64,064 injured by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the end of the war through 1998. These figures, while staggering, are probably significantly under-reported. Many victims, particularly in remote areas, do not receive medical or rehabilitative care. According to one survey conducted by Handicap International, 14% of all mine-caused amputees had not yet been born when the war ended.

Sources from the Ministry of Defense, published in Landmine Monitor 2000, estimate that 350,000 tons of mines and UXO (bom-min in Vietnamese) lay hidden in the soil, or more than 2% of a total of over 15 million tons used during the war. While precise data is hard to come by, the vast majority of this explosive material came from the US, either dropped from aircraft, scattered, or laid around border areas. The area of central Vietnam stretching from Quang Tri to Quang Ngai is generally considered to be the most seriously affected, though no comprehensive survey has been conducted to confirm this. While mine use was confined to military areas of the former South Vietnam, UXO can be found anywhere and at any time. The severe flooding in central Vietnam last November and December caused erosion in many areas, leading to mines and UXO being washed downstream. In two separate accidents following the floods in Quang Tri, three children were killed and three wounded by UXO in heavily traveled areas.