Cuba From An International Perspective

by Jana Lipman

As the Cuban revolution celebrates its 40th Anniversary, Cuba is faced with continued political and economic questions, and the world is faced with Cuba. On September 28, 1998, more than 30 scholars, diplomats, and experts convened at the Queens College Graduate School conference, "The Cuba Project: Cuba in International Perspective" to discuss Cuba's international position and its future.

The harsh, anachronistic US embargo against Cuba, along with Castro's own personality and grip on authority, make Cuba a continued political symbol in the foreign policies of the European Union, Latin America, Canada, and the United States. The conference offered perspectives from many of these players, as experts attempted to ask where Cuba is headed and its future international position.

In the first panel, "Reintegration and Reform in Comparative Perspective," the speakers discussed Cuban history. Marifeli Perez-Stable argued that despite Cuba's tendency to see itself as a "historic" country, it was necessary to understand Cuban history in the context of global communism. In order to set the stage for debate, she divided modern Cuban history into four time periods. First, she defined 1961-1965 as the "Great Moment" when the leadership and the people were in sync with each other. Second, she described 1965-1970, as the radical period where Cuba promoted its own ideology rather than Soviet policy. She also argued that while 1970-1986 is known as the "Lost Decade," that this was when Cuban socialism functioned best and addressed health care and educational opportunities. She ended by elaborating on Cuba's current position as one of the only remaining communist countries, forced to redefine itself in a post-Soviet era.

As Cuba attempts to reconfigure itself, it has pragmatically changed its policy toward encouraging foreign investment, and yet it is still set apart from the Latin American alliances and democracies. Several speakers discussed the tension that resulted out of Cuba's desire to integrate itself into the world economy without sacrificing its ideology.

In the realm of foreign investment, Cuba has reversed its long-standing policy against foreign investment and instead sought to encourage it. Jorge Perez-Lopez explained that there are, in fact, very few accurate statistics available about Cuba's foreign investments. Cuba would like to give the perception of successful foreign investment; however, because of Cuba's long-standing isolation, many countries are still reluctant to invest. To begin with, all developing countries are in tight competition for limited foreign investment dollars, and private businesses are more willing to take risks in larger more stable countries. Politically, private companies are often unwilling to risk angering the United States, and they are concerned about ongoing political constraints and intrusive arbitrary government regulations that drive up their costs.

The ultimate problem though was defined by Claes Brundenius, who said, "There is no long term strategy." He argued that without long term qualitative change, such as democratic reforms and fewer government regulations, increased foreign investment would not follow, and Cuba would not be able to support itself in the world economy despite its skilled labor force.

Internationally, Cuba has been successful maintaining its relevance, by exploiting the differences between the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Laurence Whitehead from Oxford University argued that Cuba intentionally aggravated the United States and invited the Helms-Burton law, in order to generate world sympathy for Cuba. Because of the harshness of Helms-Burton, Canada and the European Union believe the United States to be unduly punitive. The European Union is also angered that the US is legislating European economic policies, and they fear that if Helms-Burton stands it sets a dangerous precedent against the World Trade Organization's free trade principles. Thus, by playing off allies, Castro is able to blame the United States for Cuba's economic problems, and postpone a transition to democracy.

Ernest Preeg offered three models that the United States could have followed in its response to Castro: 1) remove the embargo as it had with Vietnam and China, 2) open dialogue with Cuba, or 3) tighten and squeeze Cuba economically and politically. Instead of moderating its policies, the United States chose to take a hard-line which angers even anti-Castro dissidents in Cuba for its blatant disregard of the Cuban people.

During the lunch break, Mark Entwistle, Canada's former Ambassador to Cuba, and Robert Witajewski, the Deputy State Department Official in Cuba, engaged in a lively debate over the only major foreign policy disagreement between Canada and the United States.

Entwistle argued that Castro was a pragmatic leader, and not an ideologue. He emphasized the importance of Cuban nationalism and the government's genuine belief in its accomplishments. While he recognized Castro's authoritarian leadership and the need for political change, he argued that Cubans needed to work out political changes for themselves and that the future leaders needed to come from within Cuba. Canada, the European Union, and Latin America believe that only through engagement will Cuba begin a transition to a less authoritarian regime.

In direct opposition, Witajewski argued that humanitarian issues had actually declined since the Papal visit in 1997, and that Canada and the European approach were both naīve and sentimental. When questioned by an audience member about whether the embargo was in the US's best interest, particularly given our recognition of Vietnam and China, Witajewski argued that Cuba is a different case because of its proximity to the States, the high domestic immigration, and the political clout of the Cuban American community. He did make the distinction between the US government's opposition to the "Cuban regime" as opposed to its opposition to the "Cuban people;" however, he justified the US embargo of Cuba and advocated a continued hard-line policy.

Finally, the discussion of transition was the penultimate question. Many speakers discussed Castro's age, and Mark Entwistle commented that he noticed a psychological change in Castro on his 70th birthday. Other speakers discussed the role of Cuban immigrants in Miami and their influence on US policy toward Cuba and economic influence within Cuba itself. However, Alejandro Portes argued that the greatest problem at this time is that there is no "alternative blueprint" for a post-Castro Cuba. He did not see the return of a bourgeois Miami government to Cuba as a viable alternative, nor had the government created a dynamic socialism that could survive in the 21st Century. Instead, he saw Cuba on the defensive and the future an open question.

To reach the Cuba Project at the City University of New York, Contact Mauricio Font font@troll.soc.qc.edu.

also on this page, A Second Opinion

VIEWPOINT: America's Home-Grown Cuba Policy

by William Goodfellow

It is important to understand that the Clinton administration's policy toward Cuba has nothing to do with foreign policy. Even as a candidate, Bill Clinton courted the right-wing Cuban community for campaign contributions. In 1992 he endorsed a bill sponsored by then-Congressman Bob Torricelli (D-NJ) to tighten the trade embargo. The Bush Administration initially opposed the Torricelli bill, fearful that its extraterritorial reach would antagonize our closest allies. Once candidate Clinton signed on, however, President Bush quickly followed.

Again in 1996 after Cuba shot down two planes sponsored by a Miami exile group, President Clinton outflanked the hard-line right by agreeing to sign a further tightening of the embargo sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN). But even the Helms-Burton position was not extreme enough. Although not pressed by conservatives to do so, the President went further by offering to codify most aspects of the embargo. Up to that point the embargo had been imposed using various executive orders, based on a "state of emergency." By helping the embargo to become a law passed by Congress, the Administration tied its own hands. Now only Congress could dismantle the embargo.

The policy has been driven in part by money, for the Cuban-American community in Miami gives generously to politicians who support their hard-line position. It also is driven by the dream of Democratic candidates to win Florida, the biggest electoral prize in the south. With Jeb Bush in the governor's office, this prize seems likely to be beyond the reach of the Democrats.

Opposition to Helms-Burton has been mounting. Our European and Canadian trading partners resent being told they cannot do business in Cuba, and last year at the UN only Israel voted with the United States in supporting the embargo. Moreover, the U.S. business community has become increasingly vocal in opposing the Cuba embargo, along with the other seventy-two embargoes Congress has imposed over the years. Members of Congress from grain-exporting states as well as traditional Republican free-traders have questioned the embargo, and every major U.S. newspaper has editorialized against the Helms-Burton law.

Policymakers at both the State Department and the National Security Council have been saying that their hands are tied; only Congress can change the policy, and that means that the Republican leadership must be brought along.

In October a group of mostly-Republican foreign policy heavyweights, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, Lawrence Eagleburger and George Shultz, endorsed the idea of a bipartisan commission to conduct a thorough review of US policy on Cuba. Senator John Warner (R- VA), chair of the Armed Services Committee, and twenty-four other senators, again mostly Republicans, signed on to the bipartisan commission idea. The Clinton Administration was being handed a way out of its self-imposed political box. The commission could provide the same kind if political cover for an opening to Cuba that Senators John McCain and John Kerry had provided for the opening to Vietnam.

Rather than run with this political gift, the President decided on January 5 that there would be no commission. Rather, he announced a series of measures that will have little if any impact on the people of Cuba. The embargo will be left intact, but it will be easier to send money to Cubans on the island. The number of direct charter flights will be increased and the licensing procedures will be streamlined somewhat. Americans are not forbidden to travel to Cuba, but it is illegal to spend money there without a license from the U.S. Treasury Department. Only government employees on official business, full-time journalists, and Treasury-approved academics, researchers, and relief workers are granted licenses, and processing applications often takes months. So far the administration has not provided details of the promised easing of travel restrictions.

The only real breakthrough in the January 5 announcement was permission for the Baltimore Orioles to play an exhibition game in Havana and for the Cuban national team to play a game in Baltimore. This idea was first broached by Fidel Castro himself some twenty years ago, and it is welcome.

America's Cuba policy remains hostage to the extreme right in Congress. The three Cuban-American members of Congress, two from Florida and one from New Jersey, along with Senators Helms and Torricelli, are calling the shots. The State Department and the National Security Council are on the sidelines, and there is no immediate prospect that the administration will try to reassert control. And there is no relief in sight. It has been widely whispered in Washington that President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and NSC head Sandy Berger all were willing to allow the commission idea to go forward, but it was Vice President Gore who pulled the plug on the idea. Whether it is President Gore, President Bush or President Dole in two years, it does not bode well for a more rational U.S. policy toward Cuba.

William Goodfellow is Executive Director of the Center for International Policy, a Washington-based research center. He has long experience in Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba. wcg@ciponline.org

A Second Opinion

by John McAuliff

unpublished Letter to the Editor of the New York Times

The over-cautious character of the Clinton Administration's latest policy statement on Cuba reflects the damage done to American national interests by the impeachment process.

The question now is whether aggressive implementation of implied administrative reforms could create the basis for real change in the future. The announced policy promises "licensing procedures will be streamlined" and "to develop procedures to license multiple visits for qualified individuals and groups". This could be significant if, for example, an established educational exchange or humanitarian aid group can send delegations to Cuba and invite Cubans here without submitting each trip plan and participant list for advance approval.

A page could be taken from the reform of licensing policy toward Vietnam in the latter years of the Bush Administration. Recognized not-for-profit groups were given a general license to travel to Vietnam and to provide humanitarian assistance.

US non-governmental organizations no longer had to deal with the debilitating and costly delay of case-by-case decisions by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. In fact, no application was required.

A pervasive irony of US policy towards Cuba is that in order to punish its government for restricting the freedom of its people we have grievously restricted the freedom of our own people. Symbolic exchanges of baseball games are a nice thing, but they will have marginal impact compared to opening the doors for thousands of Americans to meet and work with Cuban counterparts. Who is most threatened by the free exchange of ideas which comes best from personal contact-Havana, Washington or Miami?

Indochina Interchange: O N L I N E E D I T I O N
John McAuliff, Editor-in-Chief Amanda B. Hickman, Managing Editor

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